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ABSTRACT: 
The emergence of specialty service lines in the United States health care system presents many 
significant questions regarding the access to, provision of, and financing of healthcare. In 
general terms, specialty service lines represent the newest development in several important 
trends in the American hospital system and reflect important trends in the wider economy. 
Many claims have been made regarding the effect of physician-owned specialty hospitals, from 
their exemption from self-referral prohibitions, their diversion of services away from general 
hospitals that use high profit margins to subsidize the “safety net,” and concerns regarding the 
over-provision of technologically complex treatments in a system already heavily weighted in 
favor of specialized medicine. This study will examine the claims made about the differences of 
physician-owned specialty heart hospitals serving Medicare patients. In doing so, it will employ 
hierarchical linear modeling, the results of which indicate that specialty service lines may not 
deliver higher quality care at a lower cost when compared to their general hospital competitors. 
Rather, there are several significant factors in the hospital market, health insurance market, and 
demographic features of the population that both groups serve that may have even more 
notable effects. Because of these complications, this study finally shows the possibility for a 
dialectical movement resulting from the inadequacies of the argument up to that point, 
implying further avenues of research on the social character of the commodity of healthcare. 
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1 Introduction  
The history of the American health care system has focused on localized and specialized 
care. While some managed care organizations (MCOs) have attempted to create regionalized 
models that restrict the availability of specialized services in a geographic region, these attempts 
have been isolated, and the dominant trend has been quite different. As fully risk-based 
managed care has almost disappeared from the health insurance market, the portion of GDP 
devoted to health care and the number of providers and facilities as grown significantly. One 
emerging trend is physician ownership in facilities devoted to the treatment of a single 
condition. Whether these facilities are small independent practices, floors or departments 
within larger hospitals, or entire free-standing hospitals, they are referred to as specialty service 
lines. These specialty service lines have come under some scrutiny in recent years for several 
reasons. While the impact of specialty service lines on the cost of health care and the 
relationship between specialty hospitals and managed care markets is unclear, it does seem to 
be apparent that the American health care system is returning to an older dynamic, wherein 
hospitals and physicians work together closely, sharing in the costs and profits of caring for 
patients. 
Specialty service lines have existed for years in the American health care system. One 
recent development, however, is the ownership of these lines in whole or in part by individual 
physicians or physician groups. This development is concerning because it has the potential for 
the physician owners of the hospital to refer or prescribe services based on their own profit-
maximizing desires rather than on high-quality, effective medical care in the patients’ best 
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interests. Another important aspect of specialty hospitals is their effect on prices of health care. 
Those who study historical market organization in health care provision know the disastrous 
effects the “medical arms race” had on health care prices. As certain hospitals gained more 
specialized services, all of its neighboring hospitals had to acquire the same services or risk 
losing market share. The cost of the duplication of services was made up for by charging higher 
prices to patients. Anderson, Reinhardt, Hussey, and Petrosyan  (It's the Prices, Stupid 2003) 
identify the primary cause of rising health care costs in the United States today to be the prices 
charged for health care services. As the medical arms race drives up these prices, total health 
care expenditures will increase. Specialty hospitals, in focusing on high-profit procedures and 
potentially sparking a new medical arms race, have the potential to drive up prices and impact 
the wider market for health care. 
Another serious charge that has been leveled against specialty hospitals is that they 
“steal” revenue from general hospitals. Specialty hospitals have been shown in numerous 
studies to focus on certain high-profit procedures. When a specialty hospital opens its doors 
close to a general hospital, its patient base must come from somewhere. The concern here is 
that the specialty hospitals will skim the highest profit procedures from general hospitals, 
leaving general hospitals with the low-profit, high-difficulty procedures. This is an important 
consideration because general hospitals use revenue from high-profit procedures to cross-
subsidize low-profit but socially-necessary procedures. Microeconomic theory clearly predicts 
that businesses that cannot cover the costs of the production process will stop producing. When 
this is applied to general hospitals, services whose revenue cannot cover costs would be 
discontinued if there was no other source of revenue. High-profit procedures provide this 
revenue and enable hospitals to continue providing these services in spite of their negative 
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profits. If specialty hospitals are stealing revenue from hospitals with safety net services, then 
general hospitals may no longer be able to provide them. Bodenheimer and Grumbach 
(Understanding Health Policy: a Clinical Approach 2009) frame these fears starkly: 
…twenty-first century health care in the United States is becoming characterized by a 
single-minded quest for profitability that is threatening traditional notions of 
professionalism and community service. Emblematic of this trend is the emergence of a 
new type of for-profit hospital, the specialty hospital fully or partially owned by groups 
of specialist physicians. (p. 200) 
 These fears are so pronounced that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed by 
Congress and signed by the President in March of 2010 places severe limits on the construction 
of new physician-owned specialty hospitals. 
This study intends to examine the relationship between specialty service hospitals in 
one particular area—cardiac care—and their impact on the characteristics of the procedures 
offered. Specifically, it tries to find a relationship between physician ownership combined with 
specialization and the outcomes and costs related to specific procedures by comparing them to 
those of general hospitals in the same geographic area. Furthermore, it attempts to determine 
the relationship between managed care markets and the cost of care in specialty hospitals. At its 
heart, this study aims to answer two questions: First, is there a significant difference between 
the characteristics of healthcare provided by specialty hospitals and general hospitals? And 
second, if there are differences, what individual and market-wide characteristics can be 
identified as major factors in these differences? In answering these questions, it will employ 
both linear OLS modeling and hierarchical linear modeling, and attempt to construct a 
conceptual framework for understanding the aspects that econometric modeling cannot 
explain. 
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2 Context of Specialty Service Lines in the United States 
Hospital System 
Profile of a Specialty Hospital 
 
 The most significant and comprehensive study of independent specialty hospitals comes 
from the Government Accountability Office in the form of two studies conducted in 2003 and a 
third conducted in 2005. These studies were undertaken in response to a proposed 
Congressional ban on the construction of new facilities. The first report, “Specialty Hospitals: 
Information on National Market Share, Physician Ownership, and Patients Served” (Government 
Accountability Office 2003a), sets the definition of a specialty hospital that has been widely 
adopted in many studies, including the present one. First: two-thirds of the hospital’s Medicare 
admissions (or total admissions where that data exists) must fall into two major diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs), or into surgical categories in general. Second: the hospital must focus on 
short-term acute care for those DRGs. Third: there must be some form of physician ownership 
stake in the hospital. This definition clearly limits the scope of what can be considered a 
specialty hospital. One of the most prominent trends in the development of specialty-service 
lines is the joint hospital-physician partnership, in which a service line is developed as a 
supplement to the services of a general hospital (this topic will be discussed in greater detail 
below). The GAO definition of a specialty-service line excludes these types of ventures, limiting 
the scope of any analysis that uses it.  
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 The first GAO study also provides statistical descriptions of the specialty hospital 
phenomenon. The vast majority of specialty hospitals have been constructed since 1990, or 
more importantly, after the rise and decline of managed care in the health insurance industry. 
Of these existing hospitals, the most are orthopedic, followed by surgical, with an equal share of 
the remaining hospitals split between cardiac and women’s specialties. Furthermore, most 
specialty hospitals are much smaller than their general hospital equivalents.  This report also 
delineates how physician ownership of specialty hospitals takes shape. If anything is certain 
from this report, it is that there is no clear pattern of how physicians own specialty hospitals. 
Shares vary widely from one percent ownership to total control, with most falling somewhere in 
between thirty-one percent and seventy percent. Most individual physicians owned small shares 
of hospitals (less than three percent), and no one physician owned more than 18.2 percent. 
Most group practices that owned hospitals owned less than twenty-nine percent of the hospital, 
and only ten percent owned more than 80 percent of a hospital. Ownership characteristics of 
physician-owned specialty hospitals vary widely. 
 The second GAO study, “Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location, Services Provided, and 
Financial Performance,” (Government Accountability Office 2003b) creates a breakdown of 
hospital ownership structures and geographical locations of specialty hospitals. For the specific 
cardiac procedures examined in this study, on average one quarter of the physicians who 
directly treat patients have an ownership stake in the hospital. This contingent tends to own 
roughly 31 percent of the hospital. These two statistics imply that on average each individual 
specialist owns less than 2 percent of the hospital. This figure is somewhat misleading; however, 
as ownership tends to be concentrated into revenue-sharing group practices of physicians, 
meaning that in some cases the entire 31 percent ownership stake would be shared by one 
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group practice of a few specialists. Also related to the fiscal practices of these hospitals is the 
distribution of revenue among specialty hospitals. Among different categories of specialty 
hospitals (cardiac, orthopedic, surgical, and women’s hospitals), cardiac hospitals received the 
lion’s share of inpatient Medicare spending at 62.1 percent (for comparison, the next closest 
category was orthopedic at 18.3 percent). This fact partly influenced the decision to focus on 
specialty hospitals with cardiac programs in the current study. 
 Another important piece of information from this study was the concentration of new and 
existing specialty hospitals. The states with the largest number of new or existing specialty 
hospitals were California, Arizona, South Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana, 
followed closely by New York and North Carolina. The GAO attributes growth in these states to 
favorable state regulatory environments and demographic characteristics favorable to specialty 
hospitals. For example, states with and states without certificate of need (CON) laws each 
contain equal portions of the United States’ population. States without CON laws, however, 
were the home of nearly five times as many specialty service lines. This suggests that CON laws 
significantly hamper the development of specialty hospitals, but this question needs further 
research to rule out other demographic or regulatory factors. 
 One final important consideration in this article is the existence of emergency services in 
specialty hospitals. To begin with, 92 percent of general hospitals in the United States have 
emergency departments, most of which are in operation around the clock. Less than half of all 
specialty hospitals (45 percent) have emergency departments at all, and of those, only 17 
percent are open around the clock. Furthermore, the median number of emergency patients per 
month at general hospitals was ten times higher than that of specialty hospitals. Some of this 
difference can be attributed to differences in size, as general hospitals tend to be much larger 
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than specialty hospitals. These differences clearly indicate that the focus of specialty hospitals is 
not emergency care. 
 The findings of these two foundational studies led the GAO in 2005 to recommend that 
Congress impose a moratorium on the construction of new specialty hospitals (Government 
Accountability Office 2005), which Congress did until August 2006. Furthermore, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) prohibits any new physician-owned 
specialty facilities from receiving Medicare reimbursement. Since Medicare is the single largest 
purchaser of hospital services, this limitation makes the construction of a new facility a much 
less appealing proposition. 
Trends in the United States Hospital System 
 
 The emergence of specialty service lines in the United States hospital system does not 
exist in a vacuum. In fact, the motivation behind and results of physician ownership of hospitals 
reflect trends that have existed since the inauguration of the mature private health care system 
in the mid twentieth century. Three of the most relevant trends are the tension that has always 
existed between individual providers and hospitals; the so-called medical arms race, a case in 
which competitive forces in the hospital market will actually increase market prices; and the 
provider moral hazard problem. The character of these three trends has changed over time as 
the payment schemes have changed, but all three are relevant to the current study of specialty 
service lines and the future development of the United States hospital system. 
Physician-Hospital Relationships 
  
 Hospital-physician relationships can take on many complex forms, but all of these forms 
can be described in part by broad categories. First, physicians and hospital could have a loose 
8 
 
affiliation based on geographic proximity or treatment of the same patient base that does not 
rest on legal or financial ties. Second, physicians could be outright employees of hospitals, 
receiving a salary and treating only patients at the hospital that employs them. Third, and 
perhaps most relevant to the present discussion of specialty service lines, physicians can serve 
as owners or administrators of hospitals. In this case, the physician usually acts in a similarly to 
the situation in which he or she is employed by a hospital, although the level of clinical 
autonomy is greatly increased. In reality, physician hospital relationships will take on some 
hybrid form of these three broad categories, but these categories are still useful to consider in 
the following discussion. 
The history of the relationship between hospitals and physicians runs parallel to the 
history of health insurance in the United States, specifically with regards to the rise and fall of 
managed care. Bodenheimer and Grumbach (Understanding Health Policy: a Clinical Approach 
2009) provide useful and descriptive dividing lines in this history. Prior to the advent of managed 
care, in what they call the provider-insurer pact, healthcare providers were reimbursed on a fee-
for-service (FFS) basis in which providers were paid by the service. Physicians and hospitals were 
distinct entities in the provision of healthcare. Wherever there was a professional relationship, 
physicians viewed hospitals as a workshop of sorts—a place to access technology and resources 
that were not feasible to acquire in the individual setting. Hospitals were most interested in 
creating relationships with specialists. Where primary care physicians did have the potential to 
refer some of their patients to a hospital, specialists were seen the major source of potential 
revenue because they would be more likely to have more complex patients to refer to the 
hospital. Under the FFS reimbursement method, hospitals and physicians would generate more 
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revenue by simply providing more services, and complex patients would naturally require more 
services than healthy ones, provider-induced demand (discussed below) notwithstanding. 
Perhaps the most important feature of this phase of physician-hospital relationships is that 
hospitals and physicians remained separate entities both legally and financially. The absence of 
a direct financial relationship meant that hospitals competed to provide the most attractive 
facilities possible for specialists. This situation has significant implications on its own, and fits in 
with a broader trend of the potential overprovision of care in hospitals (also discussed below). 
Before the rise of managed care, hospitals focused on courting specialists and the referrals they 
would bring through non-financial means. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the period that Bodenheimer and Grumbach call the 
purchaser revolt and the breakup of the provider-insurer pact, FFS plans were replaced with 
various forms of managed care plans. Managed care plans had cost reduction as their explicit 
goal, although the tactics they used to achieve that goal varied widely. Perhaps the most 
important feature of managed care was the way that it changed the dynamic between hospitals 
and physicians. Managed care in the 1980s and 1990s relied on the “gatekeeper” concept of 
medical care: patients would need referrals from their primary-care physicians (PCPs) in order to 
receive specialty care. The specific methods through which the gatekeeper principle was 
enforced varied from plan to plan, but the most common came in the form of selective 
contracting. Simply put, insurance plans would only pay for visits with certain physicians and 
hospitals, meaning that individuals have strong incentives to seek out and heed referrals. 
Hospitals were suddenly much more reliant on PCPs for their business than they had ever been 
in the past.  As a result, hospitals had an incentive to develop very close ties with PCPs, and 
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these ties now began to take on a legally formal and financial character (Berenson, 
Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). The precise nature of the relationship varied from one hospital 
system to the next, but the archetypal situation was for a hospital system to purchase a primary 
care physician practice outright. Other less explicit relationships were also widely employed, 
ranging from formal independent practice associations (IPAs) that would contract with one 
hospital system for referral purposes to informal preferences in the use of certain facilities 
(Lake, et al. 2003). Whatever the character of these relationships, the goal was the same: to 
capture all possible referrals for specialty care and surgery from as many PCPs as possible. In 
anticipation of a health insurance market dominated by managed care organizations, hospital-
PCP relationships became increasingly important. Managed care organizations instituted and 
relied upon incentives that brought physicians and hospitals close together, setting the 
precedent for close formal or informal financial relationships between the two. 
 The unexpectedly slow rise and eventual decline of fully risk-based managed care in 
health insurance added a new twist to the physician-hospital relationship. While most health 
insurance plans today do still retain some elements of managed care, most have also returned 
to a FFS payment system for physician services. 1 In short, managed care worked to shift the 
financial risk inherent in the provision of care to the provider, and the return to FFS shifts the 
risk back to the insurance plan and ultimately the patient.  Where risk-based managed care 
created an incentive for hospital systems to work with primary care providers, fee-for-service 
reimbursement returns the emphasis to care provided by specialists. Once again, specialty care 
                                                          
1
 One relatively simple and particularly helpful example of the mix of risk-based and FFS plan design is the 
current state of Medicare Parts A and B. Part A, which covers inpatient hospitalization (among other 
things) employs risk-based payment based on the DRG (all providers receive the same payment for a 
given diagnosis regardless of how it is treated); Part B, which covers physician services, remains FFS. 
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is a major revenue source. One significant difference from the pre-managed care period is that 
now hospitals and physicians have no reason not to form close legal and financial relationships. 
To state the matter simply, hospitals and physicians traditionally occupy different 
domains in the delivery of healthcare, but physician-owned specialty service lines encompass 
both professional and institutional settings of care (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). 
Where most hospitals organize themselves around the specific services provided (for example, a 
medical wing, a diagnostic center, a single floor comprised of nothing but operating rooms), 
specialty service lines cross services and instead focus on conditions. As a result, many specialty 
service lines can be self-contained units, even if they are partially or entirely owned by general 
hospitals. Where institutional and professional services were once distinct components of the 
healthcare system, specialty service lines blur this boundary. Physician-owned specialty service 
lines are simultaneously reigniting old relationships with hospitals and striking out in a new 
direction. Hospitals again compete for relationships with specialists; however, now the typical 
hospital-specialist relationship becomes one with formal legal and financial force, where before 
it was only an informal one. 
The Medical Arms Race 
 
 The medical arms race also follows the rise and decline of managed care in health 
insurance. Prior to this time frame, insurance companies reimbursed hospitals for specific 
services in the traditional FFS method. Under the FFS payment system, hospitals delivered 
patient-centered care. (Dranove, Shanley and White 1993). One important feature of patient-
centered care was competition between hospitals over quality of care, and this competition was 
most fierce in less concentrated hospital markets. In pursuit of this goal, hospitals sought to 
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attract the best physicians, which generally meant acquiring the most advanced medical 
technology and creating excess bed capacity for inpatient care. The result of institutional 
competition of this nature is “a *large+ number of duplicate specialized services in local markets” 
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 421), and the consequences of service duplication are clear: “…new 
technology is acquired primarily for defensive purposes. …Hospitals constantly attempt to 
expand services to enhance their status, not because profit maximization or efficiency call for 
*it+” (Santerre and Neun 2010, 415). Empirical research generally agrees that the rise and 
dominance of managed care in the 1980s and 1990s forced hospitals to compete based on price 
rather than quality, so hospital care became “payer-driven” (Dranove, Shanley and White 1993). 
The shift to price competition made the medical arms race more difficult, as profit maximization 
(or cost minimization in the case of not-for-profit hospitals) put limits on expansions that were 
previously undertaken for status. 
Non-price competition between had a brief period of darkness in which risk-based 
managed care forced it underground, but as managed care contracts proved to be less 
burdensome than anticipated and as hospital markets grew more concentrated, non-price 
competition made a resurgence (Devers, Brewster and Casalino 2003). One of the most 
significant forms of non-price competition is to target physicians for referrals and to target 
potential patients directly (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). Furthermore, in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, hospital competition began to become more intense, and technological 
advances began to allow certain procedures to be performed in an ambulatory setting. 
Traditional general hospitals saw more well-insured patients leaving their walls for independent 
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diagnostic centers, ambulatory surgical centers, and physician-owned specialty hospitals. 
Berenson, Bodenheimer, and Pham summarize the issue well:  
“…while hospitals find a competitive need to promote a service-line orientation, an 
approach that requires the participation of key physicians, at the same time they often 
face growing competition from physician-owned service lines” (Specialty Service Lines: 
Salvos in the New Medican Arms Race 2006, 338). 
Not only are hospitals forced to compete with each other for high volumes of well-insured 
patients, they are also forced to compete to retain highly-skilled physicians who are now finding 
it profitable to strike out on their own.  
Competition for patient volumes leads hospitals to pursue aggressive advertising 
strategies. The application of the Dorfman and Steiner (1954) model of advertising to hospital 
services can offer insights regarding the structure of hospitals that pursue such aggressive 
advertising. The first key insight is that advertising expenditure will be greater when demand is 
inelastic to price. It is hard to imagine a situation in which demand is less responsive to price 
than that of health care, specifically medical and surgical interventions that require 
hospitalization. The second important implication of the Dorfman and Steiner model is that 
advertising intensity will be greater when the gap between marginal cost and price is greater—
in other words, when firms have greater market power. The reimbursement plans that many 
health insurance entities employ virtually guarantee that this situation will exist for inpatient 
hospitals, and this relationship is discussed in more detail below. It is worth noting that Dorfman 
and Steiner developed their model under the assumptions of monopoly, but the results are 
easily generalizable to any competitive structure (Santerre and Neun 2010, 409).  
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Competition for physicians leads hospitals to pursue advanced technologies and excess 
capacity. The past decade has seen growing pressure from both physicians and patients for so-
called “one-stop shopping”; that is, having diagnostic services and treatment take place in the 
same facility and even during the same visit (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). This has 
led hospitals to purchase expensive diagnostic technologies, or to make these tools more widely 
available. In addition, physician alternatives to hospital care, such as independent physician 
associations or community health centers, work to acquire the same technologies. Proliferation 
of these expensive tertiary services always seems to outpace the underlying demand for them, 
creating a system with excess capacity for technologically-intensive medical services. Excess 
capacity in this system actually serves to increase the price of care, rather than decrease it as 
traditional economic theory would suggest. Hospitals simply pass on higher per-unit costs to 
payers like Medicare and private insurance companies rather than decreasing the price to 
attract new customers (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2009). The medical arms race for 
technologically-intensive diagnostic and treatment facilities is a clear case of fierce competition 
between health care providers, but in this case, cutthroat competition does not punish high-cost 
producers and actually serves to increase prices. 
Physician-owned specialty hospitals combine patient-oriented and specialist-oriented 
competition. Furthermore, physician-owned hospitals force their general hospital competitors 
to engage in similar tactics to remain competitive, and by all accounts they have done so. 
General hospitals are not feeling the financial squeeze that they might from competing specialty 
hospitals because they are able to raise the prices that they charge to insurers and patients on 
services that specialty hospitals simply cannot provide. Often, these services include emergency 
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room services, labor and delivery services, mental health care, and other services typically 
associated with the “safety net.” In the words of one anonymous hospital administrator, 
“*h+ospital prices never fall” (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006, 342).  
Provider Moral Hazard and Physician Self-Referral 
 
 Conceptually speaking, there is a clear possibility for providers to over-supply medical 
care to their patients in order to increase their own incomes. This issue is typically presented as 
a case of a principle/agent problem: the physician is acting both as an economic agent 
representing his or her own self-interests and as someone representing the interests of the 
patient. In an obvious case of asymmetric information, the physician has the potential ability to 
sway individual decision making towards his or her own interest. Clearly, this has the potential 
to derail the typical functioning of a neoclassically-conceived market (McGuire 2000). In short, 
provider moral hazard has the potential to cause the overprovision of unnecessary medical 
services.2 In an attempt to prevent provider moral hazard from leading to the over-provision of 
medical services, Congress adopted regulations collectively known as the Stark laws between 
the 1980s and early 2000s. The main thrust of these regulations is to prevent providers from 
gaining financially through the referral of patients to services by denying Medicare 
reimbursement for referrals to facilities in which the referring physician has an ownership stake 
and by extending antitrust regulations into the medical services industry. As a result, these laws 
are commonly referred to as the anti-self-referral laws. There is one glaring exception to these 
laws, however: in the verbiage of the 2001 Stark II regulations, the surgical investor in 
ambulatory surgical centers; in more familiar terms, the physician-owner of a specialty service 
                                                          
2
 The existence and extent of provider moral hazard is probably the most well-discussed and 
contentiously-debated topics in all of health economics. Thomas Rice (2003) presents a comprehensive 
overview of studies attempting to prove and disprove the existence and extent of provider moral hazard. 
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line (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). While the moratorium on new construction and 
the end of Medicare reimbursement for new facilities may have presented serious challenges to 
specialty service lines, the exception laid out in anti-self-referral regulations removes a 
significant barrier. 
 Medicare payment of inpatient services via the DRG exacerbates provider moral hazard. 
Medicare’s DRGs are re-configured periodically in order to accommodate changes in technique 
or the emergence of new diseases. In essence, Medicare (and Medicaid, which typically follows 
Medicare’s reimbursement strategies) determines prices for treatments when they are new to 
the market. Industrial organization theories generally agree that most technological advances in 
production will tend to be most costly before they are widely adopted. The distance between 
the cost of treatment and the price paid for it grows larger over time, creating a clear incentive 
to provide newer and more technology-intensive treatments. Furthermore, Medicare’s DRG 
pricing method relies of hospital-reported costs of delivering care. According to Ginsburg and 
Grossman  “Providers have limited incentives to devote the resources to set charges that 
accurately reflect the relative costs because a large part of their revenue is not directly 
influenced by their own charge structure” (When the Price Isn't Right 2005). Outdated 
reimbursement structures have made surgery in general and cardiovascular surgery in particular 
two of the most profitable categories of medical care. Medicare isolates providers from the true 
price of the services they provide through its prospective payment system. Physician-owned 
specialty service lines exploit the inherent problems in the DRG by focusing on the newer and 
more technologically-intensive procedures that have the widest divergence between cost and 
price.  
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 Determinants of Health 
 
Healthcare in the United States is generally defined, organized, and delivered along the 
lines of individual determinants of health. The individual determinants of health model has two 
primary components: the role of individual choice in health status and the biomedical model of 
illness and treatment. The role of individual choice in health status generally argues that 
individuals’ lifestyle choices are the primary driver of their health. People that make the right 
choices will not need healthcare; poor choices lead to poor health status. The biomedical model 
of illness and treatment is probably the single most dominant trend in the training of medical 
professionals and the development of medical technology, and its influence is apparent in the 
emergence of specialty service lines. The principle tenant of the biomedical model of illness and 
treatment is the idea that all diseases have discrete, knowable causes that reside within the 
body. Diagnosis of a disease is simply the working out if this cause, and treatment can 
theoretically take the form of a “silver bullet,” although there are clearly many diseases for 
which the silver-bullet cure has not been found. This model has been the object of scrutiny and 
criticism in recent years, and the main charge against it is that it relies too heavily on 
technological solutions and highly specialized care. Indeed, the development of the United 
States healthcare system has typically highly favored specialized, technologically-intensive care, 
and many scholars attribute this trend to the biomedical model of medicine (Bodenheimer and 
Grumbach 2009). Specialty service lines offer one particular example of how the biomedical 
model manifests itself in the United States healthcare system. Specialty service lines pride 
themselves on having the most advanced technology for the treatment of specific acute 
illnesses. In doing so, they are affirming the idea that technology is the cure for each illness and 
that the illnesses that they treat have finite discrete internal causes. 
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 An opposing model is commonly referred to as the social determinants of health model. 
This conception of disease and treatment does not deny that there are discrete any knowable 
causes for diseases. Rather than these being the only relevant factors, proponents of the social 
determinants of health argue that there are a wide range of social, economic, and demographic 
factors that contribute to a person’s health. In this sense, diagnosis of a disease is a combination 
of many qualities of a patient, of which the pathological cause of the disease is only one. In a 
similar way, the treatment of the disease not only focuses on its internal cause, but also on 
education and mitigation of the causes of recurring chronic medical problems. The social 
determinants of health approach is a large and growing school of thought, though Marmot 
(Social Determinants of Health Inequalities 2005) provides an excellent summary of it. Specialist 
treatments and technologically-intensive cures still exist in a system based on the social 
determinants of health approach, but their role is greatly diminished. 
 These two opposing models have clear and different implications regarding the role of 
physicians in healthcare and the role of healthcare in society. The social determinants of health 
approach indicates that physicians will usually have a central role in healthcare, and that a 
relationship between physicians and individuals will be central to the healthcare process. 
Furthermore, since the causes of illness lie outside of the individual, healthcare will necessarily 
have a social character. On the other hand, the individual determinants of health model 
suggests that healthcare is a good that belongs in the market. Individuals make decisions that 
give them a certain health status, and the healthcare that they need as a result is subject to 
their tastes and preferences. In this case, physicians begin take on the role of the entrepreneur. 
They are selling a product that individuals will choose to consume. Their relationship with their 
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patients has the potential to become an impersonal one, like those between the buyers and 
sellers of other goods in the market. Where the social determinants of health model de-
emphasizes the role of specialized healthcare and technology, the individual determinants of 
health model raises the possibility for the simultaneously commodification of healthcare and 
professionalization of healthcare providers. 
 Specialty service lines evolved in a market context that includes a long-running history 
of interaction between insurance companies and government agencies; fierce competition 
among hospitals for a limited patient market; and changes in demographic that lead to changes 
in health status and health disparities. All of these relationships have caused transformations in 
the way that all hospitals deliver care, and these particular transformations in individual 
hospitals can be analyzed in terms of mainstream economic theory. Understanding why 
specialty hospitals are distinctive requires both an understanding of the broad context of the 
American healthcare system as a whole and of the specific operational features of individual 
hospitals. There have been few attempts to create an economically-grounded theory of 
production of specialty health care, since most studies rely on interviews or surveys. However, 
one noteworthy attempt will be discussed below. 
Neoclassical Theory of Production Applied to Specialty Service Lines 
 
Much of the following discussion of how the neoclassical theory of production can be 
applied to specialty service lines will be drawn from Schneider, Miller, Ohsfeldt, Morrisey, 
Zelner, and Li (The Economics of Sepcialty Hospitals 2008) and from Cowing and Holtmann 
(Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions 1983), with theoretical and conceptual 
development from Varian’s Microeconomic Analysis (1992) where necessary. This theoretical 
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development will then be analyzed in terms of both the findings of a set of econometric models 
and by drawing on less mainstream economic theories.  
Though Schneider et.al.  do not make the distinction, all of the six different economic 
motivators that they identify (consumer demand, economies of scale, avoidance of 
diseconomies of scope, administrative efficiencies, clinical efficiencies, and focused incentives; 
discussed below) can be grouped broadly into two categories: quality of care improvements and 
productive efficiencies leading to lower-cost production. It is worth noting that these two 
categories already acknowledge that the canonical model of perfect competition does not apply 
to the market for hospital services. On the one hand, differences in quality cannot exist when all 
firms produce the same product; and on the other hand, productive efficiencies in one firm or a 
small subset of firms would not be a sustainable situation in perfect competition. These two 
facts allow Schneider et. al. to dispense with the limitations of perfect competition and move to 
the potentially more interesting implications of imperfect competition. 
Quality of the Product 
 
Differential quality can be explained by several different factors, the first of which is 
consumer demand. Consumer demand for specialty services can largely be divided into two 
main drivers: the market’s demand for specific services and its demand to consume high-quality 
instances of these services. Schneider et. al. cite several studies that point to rapidly increasing 
consumer demand for technological-intensive treatments for specific acute conditions. General 
hospitals remain slow to adapt to this significant change in consumers’ tastes and preferences, 
and as a result specialized firms rise up to exploit this untapped segment of the market. Once 
these specific services become available, consumers begin to demand the highest quality 
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available for these services. Once again, several studies seem to support the hypothesis that 
physician-owned hospitals do deliver higher quality care, and the main driver behind high 
quality appears to be high patient volumes and financial accountability on the part of the 
physicians performing the services. The second significant driver of differential quality is high 
patient volumes, and these high volumes can be attributed to economics of scale and 
diseconomies of scope in the production of hospital services. While Schneider et. al. concede 
that there is a dearth of empirical research on either of these issues, the conceptual effects of 
both are clear: economies of scale allow specialty hospitals to improve the quality of production 
as relative more resources are devoted to fewer endeavors; diseconomies of scope prevent 
general hospitals from realizing these same improvements. 
Costs of Production 
 
Generally speaking, a hospital’s cost function takes the form:  
    (    
     )                (1) 
where    is a variable cost function,   is a vector of total outputs with the     member of the 
vector represents the output for a specific procedure or treatment,    is the vector of input 
prices,  is capital, and   represents physician labor, and    and    are the prices of capital and 
physician labor respectively (Cowing and Holtmann 1983). The transformations in production 
that are outlined below will generally result in the specific character of the    function. 
Lower-cost productive efficiencies generally fall into three categories. First, specialty 
hospitals focus their production into services for which they have higher procedural margins. 
Differences in procedural margins imply that hospitals as rational profit-maximizers specialize in 
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the services contained in DRGs for which they have the lowest costs. General hospitals fail to 
make the same decisions because they are hampered by their mission to provide less-profitable 
safety net services.3 Second, general hospitals have several internal barriers to the provision of 
care that specialty hospitals do not, meaning that specialty hospitals have what the authors 
refer to as clinical efficiencies. Understanding clinical efficiencies in specialty hospitals is easiest 
by understanding why, according to Schneider et. al., they do not exist in general hospitals: 
general hospitals have many competing missions, ranging from serving underserved populations 
to treating basic health problems and including profit only has the last in a long list. Specialty 
hospitals, on the other hand, have one mission: high volumes of patients receiving profitable 
services at a high level of quality.  The third and final advantage that specialty hospitals hold 
over their general hospital competitors is their ability to exploit “learning by doing” to lower 
costs of production. Essentially, high volumes of patients allow physicians and nurses in 
specialty hospitals to gain higher levels of expertise more quickly. This in turn allows them to 
provide care with less waste and with fewer mistakes. Once again, learning by doing is a difficult 
thing to quantify, and Schneider et. al. rely on survey responses in addition to studies that 
correlate high volume and quality of outcome to support this argument. Neoclassical economics 
suggests that firms facing a profit maximization problem are simultaneously solving a cost 
minimization problem. In examining both procedural margins clinical efficiencies, and “learning 
by doing,” Schneider et. al. come to the conclusion that the focus on profitability not only 
defines specialty hospitals, it also gives them a significant advantage in lowering costs of 
production. 
                                                          
3
 This conclusion is essentially the same as the one drawn above in the discussion of the relationship 
between the DRG are provider moral hazard, though Schneider et. al. phrase the argument in terms of 
comparative advantage. 
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 The neoclassical development outlined above identifies two significant differences 
between specialty hospitals and their general hospital competitors—quality and cost—and 
identifies several drivers for these differences. To examine these claims in the particular context 
of cardiac care provided to Medicare beneficiaries, the present study will first turn to 
econometric analyses, including linear OLS modeling and hierarchical linear modeling based on 
facility data collected from hospital cost reports and market-level data collected from other 
public data sources. While the models that follow will not be derived from cost or utility 
functions, they will still address some of the claims made above. For claims that cannot be fully 
explained through econometric analysis, a more conceptual framework will be developed. 
 
24 
 
 
 
3 The Data and the Model 
The Data 
 
Specialty heart hospitals are included in the study following the strict GAO definition 
described in the profile of specialty hospitals above: they must all be short-term acute care 
facilities, they much be free-standing facilities, they must have some form of physician 
ownership, and two-thirds of their inpatient admissions must fall into two or fewer DRGs during 
the most recent federal fiscal year of cost report data available. This yields a sample of 25 
specialty hospitals. The sample of competitor general hospitals meets several of the same 
criteria: they are also classified as short-term acute care facilities and they offer all of the same 
categories of cardiac procedures as their specialist competitors. They also meet a criterion of 
geographic proximity to a specialty hospital, and this criterion will be discussed in greater detail 
below. After these competitors are identified, the sample of general hospitals contains 15 for-
profit hospitals and 62 hospitals that fall into a not-for-profit category, which includes 
traditional not-for-profit hospitals, government-owned hospitals, hospitals owned by religious 
organizations, and academic institutions such as university hospitals. 
The primary source of hospital data in the present study is the American Hospital 
Directory (www.ahd.com). The American Hospital Directory compiles data from nearly every 
hospital’s Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) report, which hospitals are legally 
obligated to compile to receive Medicare reimbursement. The information contained in the 
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report can be divided into seven categories. First, there is information on the general 
characteristics of the hospital, including its size, total revenue, aggregate utilization statistics, 
services offered, and the mix of the patients admitted by payer source (Medicare, Medicaid, and 
private payer/self-funded patients). Second, this same high-level information is broken down to 
the level of the individual department within the hospital. Third, each hospital reports more 
detailed statistics of its revenues by payer source and its costs by high-level area (patient care, 
personnel costs, administration, etc.). This data is then used to calculate certain indicators of the 
hospital’s overall financial health, specifically its net profit margin and its return on assets and 
equity. Fifth, each hospital reports statistics on nationally-recognized quality measures for a 
broad range of health conditions and treatments. Sixth, cost and utilization information are 
reported at the aggregate treatment level for inpatient services. The seventh category contains 
the same data for outpatient services, but this area is not considered in the present study. 
Although MedPAC hospital cost reports do not contain medical record-level data that other 
more ambitious reviews of specialty service lines have utilized, the data that they do contain is 
still extremely useful in profiling the services that a hospital provides. 
One primary concern with this data source is that the data available only come from 
Medicare-covered patients and procedures. Broadly speaking, this restricts data to treatments 
that only people aged 65 and over would undergo. While this is not necessarily a significant flaw 
to this study regarding inpatient cardiology procedures, it prevents generalization to some other 
important categories of specialty hospitals, especially children’s hospitals, hospitals specializing 
in breast and cervical cancer treatment, obstetrics, bariatric surgeries, or hospitals that favor 
surgical treatment over medical treatment generally. Reliance on Medicare data for the analysis 
could potentially reduce the external validity of its results, especially in these noted areas. 
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Many non-specialty hospitals, furthermore, do not rely on Medicare as a source of 
revenue in the same way specialty hospitals do. One of the primary arguments against specialty 
hospitals is that they “steal” revenue from general hospitals. General hospitals can rely on 
Medicaid and other indigent care programs as major sources of funding (although this assertion 
is questionable). On the contrary, the majority of specialty hospitals’ revenue comes from 
Medicare. In response to this deficiency in the available data, however, Medicare is the single 
largest source of revenue for hospital services, comprising more total revenue for hospitals than 
all private funding streams combined. (Santerre and Neun 2010, 406). Furthermore, since 
specialty hospitals tend to specialize in the treatment of conditions that affect mainly Medicare 
patients (cardiology or orthopedics for example), most of the revenue that they would “steal” 
would be revenue for Medicare patients. Finally, Medicaid and other indigent care programs 
typically reimburse hospitals at a much lower rate than other insurance plans, and as a result 
Medicaid caseload is often seen as more of a burden than a benefit for general hospitals. 
Problems of incommensurability regarding revenue sources are certainly worth noting, but are 
not expected to significantly affect the results of the analysis. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and the significance of the differences in means 
resulting from a one-way ANOVA for these facility-level variables. Appendix A contains a 
glossary for these and other relevant variables. Perhaps one of the most interesting results of 
this preliminary descriptive analysis is that although specialty hospitals are much smaller 
facilities than general hospitals (measured by either number of beds or the total number of 
patients), they actually tend to have larger shares of the cardiac patient market than general 
hospitals, measured by the number of patients they treat relative to the total number of 
patients in the market. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in the total revenue 
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received from cardiac procedures between the two groups of hospitals. Clearly, the specialty 
hospitals in this sample are focusing their resources into a few procedural categories. Another 
important feature is that there appears to be no statistically significant difference in average 
cost for cardiac surgeries between specialty and general hospitals. Finally, the specialty hospitals 
in this sample do appear to have higher quality outcomes, measured by their 30-day mortality 
and readmission rates. In addition, specialty hospitals have higher nurse-to-patient ratios and 
higher amounts of capital per patient, and these results are statistically significant. These initial 
results will be the starting point for a more detailed econometric analysis below.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Facility Variables 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Total Beds*** 
General 469.01 307.39 105.00 1,836.00 
Specialty 102.72 102.93 32.00 518.00 
All 379.24 314.14 32.00 1,836.00 
Total Inpatients*** 
General 19,379.22 11,903.71 3,775.00 72,898.00 
Specialty 4,433.40 3,390.58 1,603.00 15,152.00 
All 15,716.03 12,292.10 1,603.00 72,898.00 
Market Share (All 
Patients)*** 
General 23.67% 17.47% 2.14% 84.96% 
Specialty 6.97% 4.42% 1.35% 19.68% 
All 19.57% 16.92% 1.35% 84.96% 
Cardiac 
Inpatients** 
General 1,965.87 1,423.92 335.00 8,565.00 
Specialty 1,983.32 1,327.23 745.00 6,696.00 
All 1,970.15 1,394.39 335.00 8,565.00 
Market Share 
(Cardiac Patients)** 
General 18.46% 13.19% 1.63% 54.56% 
Specialty 23.11% 10.83% 7.61% 45.44% 
All 19.60% 12.76% 1.63% 54.56% 
Total Salary Cost 
(millions)*** 
General $35.83 $31.25 $4.02 $210.70 
Specialty $9.25 $7.02 $3.38 $31.95 
All $29.32 $29.64 $3.38 $210.70 
Total Non-Salary 
Cost (millions)*** 
General $49.21 $50.10 $5.60 $378.18 
Specialty $14.44 $10.43 $4.38 $48.17 
All $40.69 $46.27 $4.38 $378.18 
Total Cost 
(millions)*** 
General $85.04 $79.70 $11.60 $588.88 
Specialty $23.69 $17.32 $7.87 $80.12 
All $70.01 $74.53 $7.87 $588.88 
Total Nurses*** 
General 710.82 625.22 65.00 4,285.00 
Specialty 150.56 170.97 0.00 678.00 
All 573.50 599.79 0.00 4,285.00 
Nurse to Patient 
Ratio*** 
General 2.06 0.87 0.33 4.40 
Specialty 2.76 1.60 0.00 7.84 
All 2.23 1.13 0.00 7.84 
Capital per 
Patient*** 
General $2,379.73 $971.14 $838.79 $5,897.51 
Specialty $3,495.38 $1,585.71 $1,936.77 $8,735.99 
All $2,653.17 $1,240.87 $838.79 $8,735.99 
Cardiac Revenue 
(millions) 
General 111.4085 97.01742 13.58 515.60 
Specialty 106.0996 89.52100 34.15 453.74 
All 110.1073 94.82705 13.58 515.60 
Cardiac Cost 
(millions) 
General 32.9379 37.21713 5.11 202.52 
Specialty 30.1851 27.14178 11.24 147.35 
All 32.2632 34.91035 5.11 202.52 
Cardiac average 
Length of Stay*** 
General 4.61 0.60 3.39 6.37 
Specialty 3.78 0.79 2.32 5.78 
All 4.40 0.74 2.32 6.37 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Facility Variables 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ED Visits not 
leading to inpatient 
stay*** 
General 29,837.66 17,459.63 7,300.00 84,200.00 
Specialty 3,620.00 4,147.49 0.00 19,700.00 
All 23,411.76 19,023.94 0.00 84,200.00 
Total ED Visits*** 
General 47,235.06 25,305.39 10,500.00 129,800.00 
Specialty 5,620.00 7,357.42 0.00 34,700.00 
All 37,035.29 28,606.32 0.00 129,800.00 
Inpatient 
Surgeries*** 
General 9,780.52 6,282.56 1,500.00 39,100.00 
Specialty 2,872.00 2,092.55 1,200.00 10,500.00 
All 8,087.25 6,297.57 1,200.00 39,100.00 
Outpatient 
Surgeries*** 
General 11,257.14 10,549.44 200.00 57,700.00 
Specialty 1,508.00 2,397.73 100.00 11,800.00 
All 8,867.65 10,142.46 100.00 57,700.00 
All Surgeries*** 
General 21,037.66 14,781.53 4,700.00 77,600.00 
Specialty 4,380.00 4,037.84 1,400.00 18,400.00 
All 16,954.90 14,836.91 1,400.00 77,600.00 
Services*** 
General 29.25 5.80 15.00 42.00 
Specialty 13.52 4.89 9.00 31.00 
All 25.39 8.79 9.00 42.00 
30-Day Coronary 
Mortality Rate* 
General 12.19% 1.69% 7.28% 19.11% 
Specialty 11.49% 1.25% 9.47% 14.68% 
All 12.02% 1.62% 7.28% 19.11% 
30-Day Coronary 
Readmission 
Rate*** 
General 22.70% 1.74% 18.15% 27.87% 
Specialty 21.47% 1.91% 17.62% 25.99% 
All 22.39% 1.85% 17.62% 27.87% 
Cardiac Average 
Cost (thousands) 
General $15.50 $6.30 $7.62 $47.16 
Specialty $14.90 $3.63 $8.80 $22.84 
All $15.35 $5.75 $7.62 $47.16 
Cardiac Average 
Charge (thousands) 
General $54.31 $17.18 $22.06 $112.55 
Specialty $51.78 $16.35 $27.53 $100.37 
All $53.69 $16.94 $22.06 $112.55 
ANOVA for Difference in Means Between Groups: 
***:       **:          *:           
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The second major data source is the Area Research File (ARF) compiled by the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Heath Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) for 2007. The 2007 edition of the ARF combines data from the 2000 census with data 
taken from community surveys, Medicare administrative data, statewide Medicaid and indigent 
care records, provider licensing databases, and a wide variety of other sources to create a 
comprehensive overview of each county in the United States, both demographically and in 
terms of health care services available and utilized. Specifically, the present study used data 
from the ARF regarding the number of people enrolled in Medicare in the region and for what 
reason (age or disability), regulatory information regarding certificate of need (CON) laws, 
poverty rates for specific groups, the prevalence of Advantage managed care plans among those 
enrolled in Medicare, and the number of federally-qualified health centers (FQHCs) in the 
market. Information on access to FQHCs could be particularly interesting because recent 
research shows a potential link between FQHC utilization and favorable health outcomes 
(Brookler, et al. 2011). Data in the ARF is usually presented at the county level, and then 
aggregated to the state level. For the present study, data are aggregated appropriately for the 
core-based statistical area (CBSAs) in question. The decision to rely on the CBSA as the 
workhorse geographic cordon will be discussed below. 
Finally, the information on insurance market competition is drawn from an American 
Medical Association study on HMO and PPO market concentrations (Competition in Health 
Insurance 2007). This study calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) values for managed 
care markets in general and HMO markets and PPO markets specifically in each metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA). The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual 
firm in a market, giving it a range of values from 0 (perfect competition) to 10,000 (perfect 
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monopoly). The Department of Justice has defined key transition points of market 
competitiveness in the HHI continuum: markets with a score of less than 1,000 are considered 
reasonably competitive; a score of 1,200 indicates potential anticompetitive concentration; any 
concentration of greater than 1,800 is considered oligopolistic; and a score of 5,000 indicates a 
duopoly.  Data were not available for all MSAs that contained a specialty hospital included in the 
study population. In these cases, the MSA that was geographically closest to the MSA of interest 
was chosen as a substitute. Specifically, Sioux Falls, SD was represented by Sioux City, IA-NE-SD 
and Wichita, KS was represented by Kansas City, MO-KS. In addition, the AMA study also 
presents the market shares of the two largest insurers in the market, as measured by the 
number of enrollees divided by the number of insured people in the market not enrolled in 
Medicare or Medicaid. These two figures can be added together to create a two-firm 
concentration measure (C2) of the competitiveness of the market. Typical protocol in the field of 
industrial organization is to add the market shares of the four, six, or eight largest firms to get a 
sense of a market’s competitiveness. The study citied only presents market shares for the two 
largest firms. This could be the result of the simple fact that many health insurance markets may 
not have more than two significant insurers once Medicare, Medicaid, and other indigent care 
financing schemes are excluded. The study’s authors do not offer an explanation. This 
information creates a picture of competition in the health insurance markets. 
The definition of the relevant product market (RPM) is never straightforward in 
economic analysis, and clearly this has the potential to be a weakness in the present study. An 
adequate relevant product market should include all alternatives that producers and consumers 
choose in response to a change in price. There has been extensive study on what exactly should 
constitute a relevant product market, and some studies suggest that for highly-specialized care, 
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the relevant product market could stretch beyond metropolitan areas or even state borders 
(Santerre and Neun 2010). Hospital data in the present study was collected under the 
assumption that the CBSA is the best choice for a relevant product market that can be easily 
defined and compared to other markets. Furthermore, the data on competition in health 
insurance markets noted above were collected at the MSA level, and MSAs are a specific type of 
CBSA. Confounding this decision is that fact that the ARF data is reported at the county level. In 
many cases, CBSAs are defined in terms of counties, so the two can often be considered 
analogously. This correspondence breaks down in the case of megapolitan cities that span 
counties or even states, yet are still defined by a single CBSA. In cases where multiple counties 
were included in the same CBSA, county-level values were replaced with average values 
weighted for the relative population of the county. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and the significance of the mean differences 
resulting from an ANOVA for these market-level variables. Appendix A contains a glossary for 
these and other relevant variables.  These results clearly indicate that there is no single type of 
market in which the specialty service lines in this sample appear. Hospital markets range from 
highly competitive with an HHI value of less than 1,000 to near monopolies with an HHI of over 
7,000. The insurance markets are less widely dispersed, but nonetheless reflect important 
differences in competitiveness. Furthermore, Medicare Advantage penetration rates vary 
widely, as does total Medicare enrollment. There is also significant variation in the number of 
FQHCs in these markets. The underlying level of heart health in the population also varies 
widely, as measured by the coronary death rate. All of these results are highly statistically 
significant, indicating that there is wide variation between the overall market structure from one 
CBSA to the next.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Market Variables 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Cardiac Inpatient HHI (hundreds of 
points)*** 
22.52 10.51 7.03 50.42 
All Inpatient HHI (hundreds of points)*** 27.09 14.40 7.29 74.45 
MCO HHI (hundreds of points)*** 34.24 14.39 15.35 72.23 
Medicare Advantage Plan Penetration 
Rate*** 
20.39% 15.44% 0.73% 40.46% 
Medicare Enrollees*** 1,878,093.07 2,817,657.53 25,440 7,862,490 
FQHCs*** 62.06 69.09 0 198 
Coronary Death Rate (per 100,000)*** 85.16 18.41 43.62 121.13 
ANOVA for Difference in Means Between Groups: 
***:       **:          *:           
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Hierarchical Linear Modeling in Public Health Analysis 
 
 Hierarchical linear modeling (also called multilevel modeling, linear mixed modeling, or 
random-effects modeling) is a relatively new technique to public health, so it is worthwhile to 
describe what it is, what its underlying structure is, and why it is appropriate for the current 
analysis. The basic concept behind hierarchical linear modeling is simple: it is a tool to explain 
individual outcomes using both individual-level and group-level variables. Variation in the 
dependent variable of a hierarchical linear model can only be explained as a function of 
variables defined at various levels, and by interactions of variables within and between levels. As 
a result, hierarchical linear modeling “allows researchers to deal with the micro-level of 
individuals and the macro-level of groups or contexts simultaneously” (Diez-Roux 2000, 174). In 
addition to recognizing the structure of the underlying data, hierarchical linear modeling also 
incorporates less orthodox statistical techniques to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Hierarchical linear modeling attempts to correct for some of the significant problems 
typically associated with linear regression with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of 
parameters. Probably the most significant difference between OLS and HLM stems from the 
presumed independence of all observations in OLS. Conceptually speaking, OLS regression relies 
on the assumption that all individuals in a population or sample are totally independent of one 
another. Once individuals are not independent, then standard errors can become biased and 
estimators will be inefficient. HLM, on the other hand, attempts to treat individual observations 
as members of groups, and groups only need to be independent of one another at the highest 
level in the hierarchy. In order to achieve this, HLM uses either maximum likelihood (ML) or 
restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation of parameters. More adequate developments 
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of the differences between OLS linear regression and hierarchical linear modeling, and of why 
ML and REML estimations may lead to better predictors than OLS estimators can be found in 
Twisk (Applied Multilevel Analysis: A Practical Guide 2006), Hox (Applied Multilevel Analysis 
1995), or Raudenbush and Bryk (Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis 
Methods 2006). 
The data described above, with individual-level hospital statistics and comprehensive 
data on the surrounding hospital market, clearly lends itself to hierarchical linear analysis very 
well. The data are taken to exist at two levels: the individual hospital level, and the county/CBSA 
level for the hospital market. In reviewing the context of the system in which specialty service 
lines exist, it should become clear that observations of individual hospitals in a market cannot 
seriously be considered to be independent of one another. All of them are subject to similar 
demographic features of the population from which they will be drawing their patients, and all 
of them are under similar pressures from the insurance companies from whom they receive 
reimbursement. Furthermore, strategic behavior exists between hospitals in the same market in 
the form of the medical arms race. Individual observations influence each other, and are also 
influenced by their group context. For these reasons, the assumption of independence of 
individual observations within the data is severely questionable. Hierarchical linear modeling 
can bypass this assumption with the aim of increasing the internal validity of the analysis. 
The Models 
 
 This analysis attempts to answer several questions, but all of these questions center 
around one issue: what are the significant differences between physician-owned specialty 
hospitals and their competitor general hospitals, specifically in terms of quality and costs of 
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production? The econometric models described below will attempt to answer this question and 
to identify significant facility-level motivators for these cost and quality differences. All of these 
results will be interpreted with a specific attention paid to health insurance market 
competitiveness wherever possible to attempt to draw conclusions about how stronger or 
weaker managed care regimes may or may not be affecting outcomes and costs. Furthermore, 
other market-level variables, for example hospital concentration and demographic data, will be 
included to attempt to explain the role of market context in driving cost and quality differences. 
In order to examine the technique of hierarchical linear modeling described above, all of the 
econometric analyses will begin using only facility-level variables in linear OLS estimation 
models, then progress to linear OLS models that contain both facility- and market-level 
variables, then finally to the hierarchical linear models of facility- and market-level variables. 
 All of the linear OLS models will take the form: 
                  (2) 
Where   is a vector of coefficients for all variables contained in the vector of independent 
variables     (which includes an intercept term), and   is a random, normally-distributed error 
term. Facility-level models are distinguished from facility-level and market-level models only by 
the particular variables contained in the vector   . By contrast, all of the hierarchical linear 
models that follow take the form: 
                                            (3) 
Equation 3 is the combination of a system of two equations. The first equation is the level one 
model: 
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                      (4)  
Where     is the intercept in the  
   hospital market,    is a vector of coefficients for level one 
variables in the     hospital market, and     is a vector of variables for the  
   hospital in the     
hospital market. The next equation represents the level two model: 
                           (5) 
Where     represents the group mean for the outcome variable, making the dependent variable 
a variation around the average;   is a vector of coefficients for level two variables;    is a vector 
of level two variables in the     hospital market. Equation 5 indicates that the intercept term of 
the linear regression is actually a random variable that is explained by group-level variables, and 
that the group-level variables will vary randomly from one group to the next. A third equation is 
often added to hierarchical linear models: 
                       (6) 
Where     represents coefficients for level one variables that depend on level two variables;   
represents a vector of coefficients for interaction between levels one and two; and     and     
are random, normally-distributed error terms. This final equation indicates that the parameter 
estimates will vary from one group to the next in addition to the intercept estimate. This 
method will not be employed in the present study. This means that the effect of all group 
variables on individual variables is assumed to be the same across all groups. Finally,     in 
Equation 3 represents a vector of terms that are interaction terms between level one and level 
two variables, and   is the corresponding vector of coefficients. Equation 3 can be divided into 
random effects and fixed effects: the error term   is a random effect and           
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represents the fixed effects of the deterministic part of the model. From this general form, 
models addressing different aspects of the present study’s questions can be defined in terms of 
the specific variables included in    ,    , and    . 
 The models for both quality outcome variables and cost variables could fall into one of 
two general categories. On the one hand, they could attempt to conform to various 
economically-derived production functions applied to hospitals. On the other hand, they could 
use an ad-hoc, intuition-based combination of variables derived from insights from previous 
research. All of the models in the present study will opt for the second choice, and the reason 
for this decision has two parts. First, the data described above does not translate especially well 
to the typical conception of a production function that depicts changes in inputs leading to 
changes in output. For example, many of the hospitals in each group are of a similar size, so 
comparing individual hospital’s inputs and outputs to create a composite “representative 
hospital” might not yield an interpretable function. Second, none of these approaches accounts 
for some of the variables that are of interest in the present study, namely managed care market 
competitiveness and population demographics. For these reasons, the functional specification 
of all models that follow will not necessarily be based on axioms of profit maximization, but 
rather attempt to show where relationships exist that may not conform to strict economic 
intuition. 
 The specific variables that are included in each variation will be defined in the results 
section below, but in general, all variables will address the three key features of any healthcare 
system: access to, provision of, and financing of healthcare. The individual-level vector     will 
include a dummy variable that differentiates specialty and general hospitals and some collection 
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of variables that could indicate what factors are driving differences between individual hospitals. 
These variables will attempt to answer how healthcare is provided, and in some sense will 
address the supply side of the market for specialty services. The market-level vector    will 
generally attempt to address issues of access to care and financing of care. Access to and 
financing of care will be represented by various demographic variables and data regarding the 
market structure of managed care health insurance plans. Additionally, some adjustment will be 
included to attempt to control for differences in the level of health between markets. The 
aspects of access and financing taken together with underlying health of the population create 
some conception of the demand side of the market. The interaction vector     begins to indicate 
how the demand and supply sides interact and influence each other. Although this analysis 
makes no claims to present interactions of production function-derived supply curves and utility 
function-derived demand curves, it still attempts to represent interactions of supply and 
demand sides of the market for hospital services in the provision of cardiac procedures.  
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4 Results and Discussion 
 
Implications of the Econometric Analysis 
 
 The neoclassical model of specialty service lines comes to the conclusion that specialty 
hospitals are economically successful for two reasons: higher quality outcomes for the patients 
they serve and lower costs of production in comparison to their general hospital competitors. 
The main driver of higher quality is identified as the ability of specialty hospitals to devote more 
resources to their patients in the form of more advanced technology and more nurses per 
patient. The main driver of lower cost in specialty service lines is argued to be their unique 
ability to exploit economies of scale; while general hospitals are hamstrung by diseconomies of 
scope associated with providing a wide variety of services. The applicability of these claims to 
the sample of hospitals providing cardiac care to Medicare patients will be examined using the 
data and methods described above. 
 Quality of the Product 
 
 The descriptive statistics above indicate that there is in fact a statistically significant 
difference between specialty hospitals and their general hospital competitors in two key quality 
measures: 30-day coronary mortality rate (mean difference 0.69%,      ) and 30-day 
coronary readmission rate (mean difference 1.23%,      ). Both of these indicators measure 
the outcome of an individual admitted to the hospital in question with either heart failure or an 
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acute myocardial infarction. For both of the indicators, lower rates indicate better outcomes 
and therefore higher quality. Another test, the independent samples   test confirms that 
significant quality differences do exist, and the results of this test are presented in table 3. The 
independent sample   test indicates that there is in fact a statistically significant difference 
between the quality of care in specialty and general hospitals, and this result holds whether or 
not the variance of individual quality is equal between specialty and general hospitals. The 
results of the Levene’s test do indicate that the variance between the two groups are equal in 
this case. Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the linear facility-level model, the linear facility- 
and market-level model, and the hierarchical linear model. One interesting meta-result in both 
tables 4 and 5 is that for facility- and market-level variables, the linear model and hierarchical 
model yield identical parameter estimates and significance levels, indicating that in this case, 
allowing the intercept terms to vary randomly from one market to the next does not add any 
accuracy or stability to the linear facility-and-market model. Furthermore, OLS estimation and 
maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters did not produce different results.  
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Table 3: Independent Samples Test for Quality Variables 
Quality Variable 
Levene's Test t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. 
Mean 
Difference 
t statistic 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
30-Day Coronary 
Mortality Rate 
.800 .373 0.69% 
=σ² 1.886 .062 
≠σ² 2.200 .032 
30-Day Coronary 
Readmission Rate 
.004 .950 1.23% 
=σ² 2.995 .003 
≠σ² 2.852 .007 
“=σ²” indicates that the   statistic applies when equal variances are assumed between the two groups; 
“≠σ²” indicates that the   statistic applies when unequal variances are assumed. 
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Table 4: Comparison of Methods for 30-Day Coronary Mortality Rate 
 
Linear, Facility 
Only 
Linear, Facility 
and Market HLM 
  ̅̅̅̅         ̅̅̅̅ =.435 
Independent Variables  ̂ Sig.  ̂ Sig.      ̂ Sig. 
Intercept 18.665 0.000 31.626 0.002 31.626 0.002 
Specialty Indicator -4.004 0.002 -2.930 0.001 -2.930 0.001 
Cardiac Market Share 0.033 0.008 - - - - 
Nurse to Patient Ratio -0.085 0.650 -0.058 0.745 -0.058 0.745 
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient Ratio 0.243 0.524 -0.201 0.398 -0.201 0.398 
Capital per Patient (thousands of dollars) -0.626 0.001 -0.624 0.000 -0.624 0.000 
Specialty Indicator * Capital per Patient 0.823 0.002 0.829 0.001 0.829 0.001 
Log of ED Visits not leading to an inpatient 
stay 
0.253 0.424 - - - - 
Log of Inpatient Surgeries -0.970 0.006 - - - - 
Services 0.026 0.448 - - - - 
Services * CON Law Indicator - - -0.041 0.011 -0.041 0.011 
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of points) - - 0.204 0.049 0.204 0.049 
MCO HHI (hundreds of points) - - 0.087 0.009 0.087 0.009 
Cardiac Patient HHI * MCO HHI - - -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.000 
Advantage Penetration Rate - - -0.440 0.057 -0.440 0.057 
MCO HHI * Advantage Penetration Rate - - 0.002 0.182 0.002 0.182 
Log of Total Medicare Enrollees - - -1.775 0.003 -1.775 0.003 
Advantage Pen Rate * Log of Total Medicare 
Enrollees 
- - 0.028 0.064 0.028 0.064 
FQHCs - - -0.011 0.232 -0.011 0.232 
Coronary Death Rate - - 0.009 0.379 0.009 0.379 
Over 65 Poverty Rate (per 100,000) - - 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.181 
Median Age - - 0.008 0.099 0.008 0.099 
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Thirty-day mortality rate. 
 The facility-level linear model in table 4 yield a few striking results. First, it confirms that 
there is indeed a difference in the 30-day mortality rate between specialty and general hospitals 
when other variables are controlled for. Cardiac market share is a significant driver of quality. A 
larger share of the cardiac surgery market relates to a .03% higher rate of mortality (     ). 
This finding addresses the claims in Schneider et.al. that higher patient volumes in a focused 
number of procedures can improve quality—as measured by the mortality rate, this does not 
seem to be the case. The linear model also show that while the nurse-to-patient ratio is not a 
significant driver of quality in either group of hospitals, the amount of capital used to care for 
the average patient will reduce the hospital’s mortality rate. An increase of $1000 in capital per 
patient correlates with a decrease in the 30-day mortality rate of .626% (     ). However, the 
coefficient on the interaction term Specialty Indicator   Capital per Patient indicates that this 
effect is totally reversed in specialty hospitals. The same increase of $1000 in capital per patient 
actually correlates with an increase in the 30-day mortality rate of .82% (     ) making the 
net effect an increase of .2%.The number of services that the hospital provides (        ) does 
not appear to have any significant effect on quality. Finally, the number of patients admitted to 
the emergency room in the hospital does not appear to have an effect on either quality 
measure. The results of the facility-level individual model does identify a few important drivers 
of quality in specialty and general hospitals. 
The addition of hospital market and insurance market variables lead to interesting 
results. The interaction term Services   CON Law Indicator indicates that the number of 
services a hospital offers will only affect quality in markets where there is a legal barrier 
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preventing hospitals from adding new services. It indicates that each additional service will 
correspond to a .041% lower mortality rate (     ) in those hospitals facing expansion 
regulations. Both hospital and insurance markets that are more concentrated have higher 
mortality rates. For example, an increase of 100 points in the HHI measurement of the cardiac 
patient market relates to an increased mortality rate of .204% (     ) in the individual 
hospital; likewise, an increase of 100 in the managed care market HHI corresponds to an 
increase of .087% (     ). The interaction term Cardiac Patient HHI   MCO HHI indicates that 
simultaneous changes in the same direction in both markets would dampen this effect. The two 
100-point increases described above would correspond to a .012% lower mortality rate (  
   ), leaving the net effect to be a mortality rate that is .279% higher. Furthermore, a higher 
prevalence of Medicare Advantage plans reduces the average coronary mortality rate, though 
the marginal increase in Advantage enrollment associated with an increase in total Medicare 
enrollment reduces this effect according to the parameter Advantage Penetration Rate   Log of 
Medicare Enrollment. The coefficient on this parameter is .028 (     ), which indicates that 
the proportion of a one percent increase in Medicare enrollment that opts in to Medicare 
Advantage correlates with a .028% higher coronary mortality rate at the individual hospital 
level. This effect is statistically significant, and combining this result with the parameter on the 
variable Advantage Penetration Rate (-.44, p < .07) suggests that the features of Medicare 
Advantage plans that improve quality may exhibit diminishing marginal returns. Finally, the 
number of people enrolled in Medicare appears to be related to a lower mortality rate at the 
individual hospital level. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Methods for 30-Day Coronary Readmission Rate 
 
Linear, Facility 
Only 
Linear, Facility 
and Market HLM 
  ̅̅̅̅         ̅̅̅̅ =.090 
Independent Variables  ̂ Sig.  ̂ Sig.      ̂  Sig. 
Intercept 23.050 .000 35.926 .010 35.926 .010 
Specialty Indicator .355 .825 -.775 .528 -.775 .528 
Cardiac Market Share -.035 .028 - - - - 
Nurse to Patient Ratio .260 .284 .182 .458 .182 .458 
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient Ratio -.345 .482 -.421 .199 -.421 .199 
Capital per Patient (thousands of dollars) .008 .972 -.072 .748 -.072 .748 
Specialty Indicator * Capital per Patient -.048 .888 .300 .348 .300 .348 
Log of ED Visits not leading to an inpatient 
stay 
.365 .373 - - - - 
Log of Inpatient Surgeries -.473 .293 - - - - 
Services .010 .823 - - - - 
Services * CON Law Indicator - - .040 .071 .040 .071 
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of points) - - .160 .259 .160 .259 
MCO HHI (hundreds of points) - - .020 .653 .020 .653 
Cardiac Patient HHI * MCO HHI - - -.004 .028 -.004 .028 
Advantage Penetration Rate - - -.738 .021 -.738 .021 
MCO HHI * Advantage Penetration Rate - - .004 .030 .004 .030 
Log of Total Medicare Enrollees - - -1.508 .066 -1.508 .066 
Advantage Pen Rate * Log of Total Medicare 
Enrollees 
- - .046 .031 .046 .031 
FQHCs - - -.006 .626 -.006 .626 
Coronary Death Rate - - .005 .731 .005 .731 
Over 65 Poverty Rate (per 100,000) - - .000 .012 .000 .012 
Median Age - - .006 .383 .006 .383 
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Thirty-day readmission rate. 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the same three models applied to the 30-day coronary 
readmission rate. The first result is that there is no longer the striking and significant coefficient 
on the variable Specialty Indicator, meaning that there is no significant difference between the 
two groups of hospitals when other variables are taken into account. The estimate associated 
with Cardiac Market Share tells the opposite story from the 30-day mortality rate. An increase 
of one percent in the hospital’s cardiac market share correlates to a .035% decrease in its 
readmission rate (     ), indicating a quality improvement. The nurse-to-patient ratio still 
remains insignificant, as do the number of services offered and the hospital’s ER volume. 
Interestingly, the average amount of capital used in treating patients is not at all significant. 
While the facility-level model indicates that the difference in readmission rates between 
specialty and general hospitals may not be as clear as originally predicted, it does not offer 
much in the way of identifying significant potential drivers behind this lack of difference. 
The inclusion of market-level variables into the model begins to bring some important 
motivators to light. First, the interaction term Services   CON Law Indicator indicates that the 
number of services a hospital offers will only affect quality in markets where there is a legal 
barrier preventing hospitals from adding new services. Each additional service relates to a .04% 
higher readmission rate (     ) in hospitals in regulated markets. Interestingly, the 
concentration of hospital and insurance markets on their own do not have a statistically 
significant relationship to the readmission rate, though acting together they do. The 
simultaneous 100-point increase in both cardiac care and managed care organization HHIs 
illustrated in the previous sections correlate to a .004% lower rate of readmissions (     ).The 
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role of Medicare Advantage seems to be playing a similar role in the readmission measure as it 
does for the mortality measure: increases in Advantage penetration correspond to decrease in 
hospitals’ readmission rates, though the marginal effect (Advantage Penetration Rate   Log of 
Medicare Enrollment) dampens this effect in a way similar to that outlined above. Finally, the 
rate of people over 65 living in poverty has no effect, and this result is statistically significant 
(     ), calling into question the claim that general hospitals are hampered by their missions 
to provide indigent care. 
 The inclusion of market variables in predicting both quality measures tells a different 
story from examining the facility variables alone. First of all, two facility-level variables, total 
inpatient surgeries and total emergency department volume, lose their predictive value. 
Secondly, although the role of insurance and hospital markets is not a straightforward one, it is 
clear that the surrounding market structure makes an important impact of the quality of a 
hospital’s care, and this impact is statistically significant. Concentration in the health insurance 
market and the Medicare Advantage penetration rate seem to act in opposite directions. Part of 
this contradiction may be explained in the definition of the variables. Data on managed care 
competition specifically excludes Medicare managed care enrollees, while data on a hospital’s 
coronary mortality rate covers only Medicare enrollees. Though the relationship between the 
two is large and statistically significant, it may actually be reflecting an underlying relationship 
not contained in the current dataset. Individual-level variables clearly have important 
relationships with the quality of care, but adding market-level variables greatly aids in explaining 
differences in quality. In the neoclassical development of the production of health by specialty 
service lines, several key factors were identified as drivers of higher quality in specialty hospitals. 
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Though there may be some significant differences at the individual facility level, the effects of 
hospital and health insurance markets and regional demographics clearly have an effect, though 
the precise nature of this effect remains unclear. 
 Costs of Production 
 
Despite anecdotally reported advantages of specialty hospitals and the neoclassical link 
between specialization and reduced cost, the descriptive statistics above do not indicate a 
significant difference in average cost between specialty hospitals and their general hospital 
competitors. To confirm this initial result, table 6 contains the results of an independent sample 
  test for equality of means of total cost for cardiac care and average cost per cardiac patient 
between specialty and general hospitals. The Levene’s test indicates that the variance of cardiac 
average cost is equal between specialty and general hospitals, and the   test indicates that there 
is not a statistically-significant difference between them. Despite the fact that there is not a 
significant difference in the cost of cardiac care, the progression of models will be applied to 
attempt to understand why claims might be made to the effect that specialty hospitals are 
lower-cost producers. Tables 7 and 8 contain the results of these models. 
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Table 6: Independent Samples Test for Average Cost 
 
Levene's Test t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. 
Mean 
Difference 
t statistic Sig. (2-tailed) 
Total Cardiac Care Cost 
(millions of dollars) 
1.231 0.270 2.753 
=σ² 0.341 0.734 
≠σ² 0.400 0.691 
Average Cardiac Care Cost 
(thousands of dollars) 
1.141 0.288 0.601 
=σ² 0.453 0.652 
≠σ² 0.589 0.558 
“=σ²” indicates that the   statistic applies when equal variances are assumed between the two groups; 
“≠σ²” indicates that the   statistic applies when unequal variances are assumed. 
  
51 
 
Table 7: Comparison of Methods for Total Cost (Millions of Dollars) 
 
Linear, Facility 
Only 
Linear, Facility 
and Market HLM 
  ̅̅̅̅         ̅̅̅̅ =.569 
Independent Variables  ̂ Sig.  ̂ Sig.      ̂ Sig. 
Intercept -77.587 .000 90.631 .001 91.193 .032 
Specialty Indicator 70.589 .002 14.267 .377 16.730 .277 
Nurse to Patient Ratio 1.083 .782 2.169 .505 2.243 .473 
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient 
Ratio 
-.440 .935 -.521 .905 -2.264 .587 
Capital per Patient (thousands of 
dollars) 
13.504 .000 7.743 .009 6.868 .015 
Specialty Indicator * Capital per Patient -13.623 .010 -5.386 .202 -4.381 .273 
Cardiac Market Share .042 .863 2.957 .001 3.591 .000 
Services 2.578 .000 .796 .000 .801 .011 
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of points) - - -3.887 .000 -3.778 .014 
Cardiac Market Share * Cardiac Patient 
HHI 
- - -.046 .099 -.068 .029 
MCO HHI (hundreds of points) - - -2.517 .000 .083 .020 
Cardiac Patient HHI * MCO HHI - - .067 .011 -2.980 .004 
Advantage Penetration Rate - - 5.124 .046 3.764 .322 
Advantage Penetration Rate * Log of 
Medicare Enrollment 
- - -.427 .027 -.325 .263 
FQHCs - - .224 .034 .204 .202 
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Total Cost. 
 
Once again, the facility model on its own, shown in table 7, reveals several important 
relationships. First and most noteworthy is that when these other facility characteristics are 
controlled for, specialty hospitals do seem to have higher total costs of cardiac care than general 
hospitals. The regressions presented in table 8 do not contain a variable for the size of the 
hospital, which may seem counterintuitive at first. However, the results of the ANOVA for the 
differences in means for total cost of cardiac care indicate that specialty and general hospitals is 
negligible. Despite the lower overall size of specialty hospitals, they tend to be similar to general 
hospitals in terms of cardiac care. As a result, the size of the facility is not deemed as variable 
directly relevant to the regressions. The nurse to patient ratio does not appear to have any 
relationship to total cost. Capital per patient is a significant driver of total cost: in general 
hospitals, an increase in capital per patient by $1000 increases total cost by over $13 million 
(     ). This relationship is totally reversed in specialty hospitals, however. The same $1000 
increase in capital per patient actually relates to a net decrease in total cost of $600,000 
(     ). Each individual hospital’s market share does not appear to have a significant 
relationship with either total or average cost. The number of services the hospital offers appears 
to significantly increase the total cost of cardiac care. 
 Adding the effects of hospital and insurance markets tells a somewhat different story, 
and the OLS linear model and hierarchical linear model yield somewhat different results. The 
inclusion of market factors changes the apparent effects of facility variables. To begin with, 
variable Specialty Indicator is no longer significant, indicating that when market variables are 
controlled for, any difference in total cost between the two become insignificant. The nurse-to-
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patient ratio remains insignificant. Capital per patient still has a positive correlation with total 
cost, but the reversal of this relationship for specialty hospitals disappears. Intuitively, the share 
of the cardiac market that an individual hospital controls also has a positive correlation with its 
total cost. As a hospital treats a larger portion of patients, it is to be expected that its total costs 
will increase, even allowing for potential economies of scale or increasing returns. Finally, the 
number of services the hospital offers also relates to a higher total cost of cardiac care. 
At the market level, both the linear model and hierarchical model agree that higher 
concentration in the cardiac care market will result in lower total costs for individual hospitals. 
Though this result is counterintuitive at first, it makes sense in light of the coefficients on the 
parameters Cardiac Market Share and Cardiac Market Share   Cardiac Patient HHI: total costs 
for the large hospitals in concentrated markets increase, but the average cost of any given 
hospital decreases, and these results are statistically significant. Take for example an increase of 
100 points in Cardiac Patient HHI brought on by a 10% increase in one hospital’s market share. 
The parameter estimate of Cardiac Patient HHI suggests that this would lead to a decrease in 
total cost of approximately $3 million (     [   ]      [   ]) in the average hospital, 
but an increase in between $30 and $36 million (     [   ];      [   ]) for the hospital 
whose market share increased, which yields a net increase in total cost for that hospital. Total 
output shifts from the wider market to the firm that increases its output. 
The concentration of the health insurance market and its interaction with the hospital 
market also provide interesting results. In the linear model, concentrated health insurance 
markets seem to indicate lower total cardiac care costs. This makes intuitive sense, as managed 
care organizations do have influence over how hospitals will provide care to patients through 
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their reimbursement strategies, and these effects should not be radically different between 
populations covered by private insurance and populations covered by Medicare. Essentially, cost 
containments put into place by private insurance companies will have spillover effects on the 
types of care provided to Medicare patients, and these effects should be more pronounced in 
concentrated markets. The interaction term Cardiac Patient HHI   MCO HHI indicates that 
concentrated hospital markets with slightly counteract this effect. Considering the same two 
parameters in the hierarchical linear model shows opposite results, however: managed care 
market concentration only acts to reduce total cost in conjunction with hospital market 
conditions; on its own, it actually increases total cost. A further interesting turn in the managed 
care market is the role of Medicare Advantage. In the linear model, Medicare Advantage 
appears to increase costs, though at a decreasing rate for the marginal increase in Advantage 
enrollment associated with an increase in total Medicare enrollment. In the hierarchical model, 
it has no significant effect. 
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Table 8: Comparison of Methods for Average Cost (Thousands of Dollars) 
 
Linear, Facility 
Only 
Linear, Facility 
and Market HLM 
  ̅̅̅̅         ̅̅̅̅ =.300 
Independent Variables  ̂ Sig.  ̂ Sig.      ̂ Sig. 
Intercept -9.940 0.281 10.192 0.084 9.944 0.109 
Specialty Indicator 3.150 0.419 3.538 0.314 3.581 0.342 
Cardiac Average Length of Stay 2.087 0.036 2.406 0.006 -0.262 0.699 
Nurse to Patient Ratio -0.086 0.902 -0.273 0.685 0.458 0.616 
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient 
Ratio 
0.043 0.964 0.509 0.574 1.895 0.003 
Capital per Patient (thousands of 
dollars) 
2.011 0.003 1.913 0.002 -1.217 0.170 
Specialty Indicator * Capital per 
Patient 
-1.036 0.270 -1.252 0.153 -0.279 0.062 
Cardiac Market Share -0.067 0.122 -0.285 0.045 -0.502 0.007 
Log of Inpatient Surgeries 1.738 0.140 - - - - 
Services -0.109 0.425 -0.055 0.241 -0.001 0.991 
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of 
points) 
- - -0.512 0.001 0.011 0.019 
Cardiac Market Share * Cardiac 
Patient HHI 
- - 0.012 0.009 0.843 0.058 
Advantage Penetration Rate - - 0.860 0.021 -0.057 0.075 
Advantage Pen Rate * Log of Total 
Medicare Enrollees 
- - -0.059 0.029 2.424 0.014 
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Average Cost. 
 
The facility level model outlined in table 8 is able to identify a handful of statistically 
significant relationships and address some of the claims raised in the neoclassical model. First, 
the Specialty Indicator variable is not significant, so there is no difference in average cost per 
patient when other facility variables are controlled for. Average length of stay is correlated with 
higher average costs, which reflects a clear clinical relationship. Patients that have longer stays 
in the hospital generally have more complicated cases, so an increase in average cost for these 
patients is to be expected. The nurse-to-patient ratio does not appear to have any significant 
effect on average cost. This is an interesting counterintuitive result on its own, because an 
increase in the nurse-to-patient ratio means that a hospital is expending more resources in 
treating the average patient. Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with the above model for 
total costs. The average capital per patient is a significant driver of higher average costs, and this 
relationship also makes intuitive sense. None of the other facility-level variables appear to be 
significantly related to average cost. 
The inclusion of market-level variables has a few interesting effects on facility-level 
variables in both the linear OLS and hierarchical linear models, although neither case makes 
Specialty Indicator significant. Capital per patient remains significant in the OLS linear model, 
but the hierarchical linear model not only reverses the sign, but lowers the significance level. 
Capital per patient does become a significant driver of lower average cost for specialty hospitals, 
however, as indicated by the interaction term Specialty Indicator   Capital per Patient. A further 
notable result of the hierarchical linear model is that the nurse-to-patient ratio does become 
significantly correlated with higher average costs only in specialty hospitals, as indicated by the 
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interaction term Specialty Indicator   Nurse to Patient Ratio. Furthermore, the variable 
Cardiac Market Share becomes significantly correlated with lower average costs, and this result 
will be explained in more detail below. Adding market-level variables clarifies a few of the 
relationships between facility-level variables and average cost. 
 The relationship between average cost and market conditions may be more 
straightforward than that between total cost and market conditions. Most notable is that the 
relationship of the private insurance market and the average cost of cardiac care is not 
statistically significant. Hospital market concentration is still a major factor, although the two 
estimation methods disagree on the particular nature of the effect. The OLS linear model 
indicates that concentrated markets will have lower average costs, and the size of the individual 
firm will accentuate this effect. The hierarchical linear model indicates that average costs will be 
slightly higher for all firms in concentrated markets, but they will be much lower for the larger 
firms in those markets. Returning to the above example of an increase of 100 points in cardiac 
market HHI brought on by an increase of 10% in one firm’s market share,  the average firm in 
the market would see average costs either decrease by roughly $500 according to the OLS 
model (     ) or increase by roughly $800 according to the HL model (     ). The firm that 
increases in size would see average costs decline by between $2850 according to the OLS model 
(     ) and over $5000 according to the HL model (     ), leading to an unambiguous net 
decrease in average cost per patient. Both models suggest that Medicare Advantage will have 
the effect of increasing costs, though the linear model suggests that costs will increase at a 
decreasing rate as enrollment increases. On the other hand, the hierarchical linear model 
indicates that lower costs can be associated with Medicare Advantage enrollment, but the 
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marginal increase in Medicare Advantage enrollment associated with an increase in total 
Medicare enrollment counteracts this effect. 
 Relationships between total cost and average cost allow for preliminary evaluations of 
claims made about specialty hospitals’ ability to exploit economies of scale and general 
hospitals’ inabilities to overcome diseconomies of scope. Crudely defined, economies of scale 
create a situation in which average cost decreases as a result of an expansion in an existing line 
of production; economies of scope have the same effect when the firm adds new but related 
lines of production. Comparing the effects that certain parameters have on total and average 
costs may begin to show where economies or diseconomies of scale or scope exist, if at all. 
Table 9 presents the results of the hierarchical linear models for total and average cost, 
displaying only those independent variables that the two models share. 
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Table 9: Hierarchical Linear Models for Total and Average Costs 
 
Total Cost (millions 
of dollars) 
Average Cost 
(thousands of dollars) 
Independent Variables      ̂ Sig.      ̂ Sig. 
Intercept 91.193997 .032 3.581 0.342 
Specialty Indicator 16.730445 .277 -0.262 0.699 
Nurse to Patient Ratio 2.243260 .473 0.458 0.616 
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient Ratio -2.264987 .587 1.895 0.003 
Capital per Patient (thousands of dollars) 6.868600 .015 -1.217 0.170 
Specialty Indicator * Capital per Patient -4.381407 .273 -0.279 0.062 
Cardiac Market Share 3.591233 .000 -0.502 0.007 
Services .801333 .011 -0.001 0.991 
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of points) -3.778678 .014 0.011 0.019 
Cardiac Market Share * Cardiac Patient HHI -.068555 .029 0.843 0.058 
Advantage Penetration Rate 3.764542 .322 -0.057 0.075 
Advantage Penetration Rate * Log of Medicare 
Enrollment 
-.325250 .263 2.424 0.014 
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The coefficients for each model in table 9 on the variable Cardiac Market Share seem to 
indicate that there may be economies of scale to be gained in inpatient cardiac care. As market 
share increases (meaning that the individual hospital is treating more patients), total cost 
increases, but average cost decreases, and both of these results are statistically significant. It is 
important to note, however, that this result holds for both specialty and general hospitals, so if 
this economy of scale can be taken to exist, it is one that is external to individual firms—it 
applies to the “industry” of heart surgery as a whole. To further support this result, a model 
including the interaction term Specialty Indicator   Cardiac Market Share does not produce 
meaningful statistically significant results, but rather serves to dilute the effect of the market 
share variable. Another potential measure of specialty hospitals’ advantages yield different 
results. While an increase in capital per patient results in increased total costs for both groups, 
only specialty hospitals see a simultaneous fall in average cost. Specialty hospitals may be able 
to exploit a return to capital that general hospitals are not. It is worth noting, however, that this 
effect is greatly outweighed by the increase in average cost that the nurse-to-patient ratio 
uniquely brings to specialty hospitals. Economies of scale cannot be conclusively proved or 
disproved from these models, but these models do show that while economies of scale may 
exist for heart surgery, specialty hospitals are not clearly exploiting them in a unique way that 
makes them unambiguous lower-cost producers. 
 Economies of scope are more difficult to define and measure than economies of scale. 
The closest approximation in the above models is the independent variable Services, which 
measures the number of distinct service lines the hospital is certified to provide to Medicare 
patients. Intuitively, general hospitals tend to have a higher number of services than specialty 
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hospitals. The coefficients on this parameter do show that as the number of services offered 
increases, so does the total cost of providing cardiac care, but there is no significant effect on 
average cost. As a result, the economies or diseconomies of scope cannot be conclusively ruled 
in or out. 
 Once again, there do appear to be significant differences between individual hospitals 
that affect the cost of the care they provide to Medicare cardiac patients, but these facility-level 
differences exist in the context of health insurance and hospital market factors that may either 
work against facility-level differences or accentuate them. Hospitals in concentrated markets 
consistently have higher average costs, but the prevalence of managed care in the Medicare 
population may reduce this effect. Finally, although there may in fact be economies of scale 
inherent in the delivery of inpatient cardiac care, it is not clear that specialty hospitals are taking 
advantage of this feature in a unique way, nor is it clear that general hospitals are undercut by 
the wide variety of services they provide. 
 Avenues of Further Research 
 
 The econometric analysis clearly has room for further investigation. One important 
opportunity could be to expand the definition of specialty service lines, either procedurally or 
structurally, with the aim of improving the external validity of the results. Doing so could 
improve the results by both increasing the sample size and adding qualitative variety to the 
members of the sample. Another potentially fruitful avenue of study would be to compare 
hospital behavior in markets that have one or more specialty service lines to markets that do 
not. Doing so would allow for an analysis of what market factors can be identified as being 
important to the development of specialty service lines. Finally, time-series data could be used 
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to examine the interactions of specialty service lines and their competitors in the context of 
hospital and insurance markets. Several researchers have noted anecdotal or survey-based 
relationships that change hospital behavior over time; for example Berenson, Bodenheimer, and 
Pham (Specialty Service Lines: Salvos in the New Medican Arms Race 2006) or Devers, Brewster, 
and Casalino (Changes in Hospital Competative Strategy 2003); but no studies have used 
Medicare cost report data in combination with hospital and insurance market data to attempt to 
define statistical relationships. 
 The existence of specialty service lines in the United States hospital system raise many 
important questions about the way healthcare is provided in society and the role of physicians 
in the hospital system and healthcare in general. A handful of questions are raised by 
considering specialty service lines in terms of neoclassical economics: specialty hospitals are 
claimed to employ product differentiation in the form of higher quality healthcare; and they 
allegedly take advantage of economies of scale and avoid diseconomies of scope. Furthermore, 
consumer demand is identified as the primary reason for the emergence of specialty service 
lines. Insofar as these claims can be analyzed with statistical techniques, econometric results do 
not provide a conclusive affirmation or disproval of these claims. Quality is not a clear thing to 
measure, but any differences that may exist disappear upon the consideration of facility- and 
market-level factors. Diseconomies of scope do not appear to exist for the hospitals considered 
in this study, and while economies of scale do exist, it does not appear that specialty hospitals 
are exploiting them in a unique way. More questions are raised when considering specialty 
service lines from a public health or health system perspective, and neither the neoclassical 
economics approach nor the existing body of public health research can adequately answer 
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them. These wide-ranging questions generally deal with issues of how healthcare fits into 
society and how physicians fit into the healthcare system. A full analysis of these questions is 
beyond the scope of the present study, but the following section suggests the beginnings of a 
potentially useful framework for further research. 
Healthcare in Specialty Service Lines: Useful Services Produced For 
Exchange 
 
 Clearly the development of the physician-owned specialty hospital is a continuation of 
many important trends in the United States hospital system, but in a larger sense, it is a 
microcosm of several important movements in the development of the capitalist mode of 
production. Healthcare services seem to clearly fit Marx’s (1990) three-part definition of a 
commodity: they are useful, they are the results of laboring activity, and their producer sells 
them rather than using them immediately. Examining the healthcare that specialty service lines 
provide in terms of each component of this three-part definition helps to illustrate the 
motivation for the development of specialty-service lines not only in the context of the United 
States’ hospital system, but also in the larger movement of the capitalist mode of production. 
Two contradictory trends emerge from considering specialized healthcare in this framework: 
commodification and professionalization. Both of these trends address key question about what 
the emergence of specialty service lines does to healthcare and to physicians. Neither of these 
trends will be explained fully here, but rather, the following sections aim to show that the 
contradictory movement between the two is a fertile ground for further analysis of the issue of 
specialty service lines. 
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The Role of Healthcare in Society: Commodification 
 Consumer Demand. 
 
The first property of a commodity laid out in the definition above is that it must be 
useful, or have what Marx calls use-value. Marx’s development of the commodity in Capital 
(1990) and in the Grundrisse (1993) defines use-value as the particular characteristics of a 
commodity that allow it to satisfy a need or want. Applying this property to the healthcare 
delivered in specialty service lines addresses the claim that specialty service lines are responding 
to “consumer demand” for expensive, technologically-intensive, highly specialized treatments. 
Patients can demand better health, but they have little ability to demand particular treatments 
for their illnesses in an immediate sense.4 Mainstream health economics ascribes this problem 
to a variety of market failures. Asymmetrical information forces patients to rely on their doctors’ 
recommendations; imperfect competition in the provider market distorts incentives; consumer 
insensitivity to price due to insurance forces them to demand more than they would otherwise 
(Santerre and Neun 2010); the biomedical model of illness and treatment conditions physicians 
to look for new technologies in search of a “silver bullet” cure (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 
2009). All of these explanations acknowledge that the healthcare services that are demanded 
depend in a very important way on the ability of people to access services, characterized by the 
market context in which providers and patients are situated. None of these explanations, 
however, allow for the possibility that the only services that can be accessed are the 
technologically-intensive expensive services and that this phenomenon is the result of the 
pursuit of profit.  
                                                          
4
 This does not rule out the possibility that individuals want treatments that don’t exist yet, for example a 
cure for cancer. Rather, in any one episode of disease and treatment, the healthcare commodities that an 
individual can choose from must already exist, whatever long-term aspirations the healthcare system may 
have. 
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This initial claim requires an explanation of the reasons behind hospitals’ drive to 
purchase advanced technology. Several plausible explanations have been advanced in the 
literature. For example, returning to the discussion of the medical arms race above, hospitals 
pursue advanced technology for the high profile that comes with being on the cutting edge of 
treatment, and to capture the largest possible market share. Exploring physician-hospital 
relationships shows that competition between hospitals in order to attract physicians often 
takes the form of acquiring new technology. All of the econometric analyses above begin to 
refute the claim that capital-intensive care necessarily always results in better outcomes and 
lower costs. These explanations are useful, but there is one theme tying them all together: the 
pursuit of profit in the production of healthcare services. The drive for profit always spurs the 
application of new technologies in the capitalist mode of production, and the particular working 
out of this process in specialty-service lines must be considered briefly next. 
 Proletarianization of Health Services. 
 
In the 1980s, sociologists Donald Light and Sol Levine began to describe the process of 
what they call the “proletarianization of health professions.” This process is one by which 
healthcare providers at all levels are put in the position of the wage laborer in the capitalist 
mode of production. In order for this process to occur, the rise and dominance of 
technologically-intensive healthcare must be a particular instance of the real subsumption of 
labor-power to capital. At the conceptual level, the process of the real subsumption of labor to 
capital begins with the replacement of human action in the three main areas of productive 
activity: the tool, the transmission mechanism, and the motive power. The pursuit of profit 
drives this process of replacement, and the primary way this occurs is through reducing tasks to 
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smaller and less complex components that could be performed with less human intervention. 
Marx’s description of this process leaves the worker in the productive process in an ancillary 
position to the vast superstructure of machinery (Marx, Capital 1990), and Light and Levine 
intentionally invoke this image in describing the transformation of the medical profession: “The 
institutional and technical character of medical work has become so complex that it threatens to 
make physicians an appendage to rather than a master of their technology” (1988, 10). 
It may be difficult to rationally conceive of heart surgery as a simple task, but the 
neoclassical argument laid out above makes an important case for this consideration. In 
describing specialty hospital’s abilities to exploit the advantages of learning by doing, Schneider 
et. al. describe a process by which a firm can improve its productive process by the repetition of 
simple tasks by experienced physicians and nurses. They apply that argument that “simplicity, 
repetition, experience, and homogeneity of tasks breed competence” (Schneider, et al. 2008, 
12) to the production process of the hospital. In addition to the responses to the authors’ 
surveys, they cite numerous studies that all seem to show the same trend. General hospitals 
have the potential to achieve the same decomposition of the task into its smaller components, 
but so far have not been able to do so because of “incentive attenuation” (Schneider, et al. 
2008, 14). In other words, because they are not profit-maximizing, they are not inclined to 
follow this trend. Specialty hospitals, on the other hand, see the benefit in breaking down and 
automating services to the greatest extent possible. In so far as heart surgery can be reduced to 
a large number of small and simple tasks, specialty hospitals are pursuing this path with vigor. 
Applying the term “proletariat” to physicians can also be problematic. The typical 
Marxian conception of a proletariat class is a class of workers that have little or no control over 
their working conditions and the particular character of the tasks that they do (Light and Levine 
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1988), (Marx, 1844 Manuscripts 1988). In very meaningful ways, these two defining 
characteristics of the proletariat do not apply to physicians. Hospital competition for specialists 
gives specialists considerable say in their work environments, and the decline of managed care 
in insurance has greatly decreased the use of practices like utilization reviews to influence how 
they treat patients. Nonetheless, there is an important case to be made that the drive for profit 
is changing the way in which care is provided. The decreases in cost associated with specialty 
hospitals that is implied in the neoclassical argument and partially confirmed through 
econometric analysis (specifically tables 7, 8 and 9 and their accompanying discussions) show 
that when profit is the explicit goal of production, care is delivered differently. Rather than 
invalidating the concept of proletarianization, the particular characteristics of the role of the 
physician in providing care set up the first half of an important contradictory movement in the 
commodity that is specialty service line-delivered healthcare. The second half of this 
contradiction lies in the role of the physician in pursuing profit, which will be explored next. 
The Role of Physicians in Healthcare: Professionalization, or the Physician as 
Capitalist 
 
 In the introduction to this analysis, a quote was presented regarding the dangers of 
physician-owned specialty service lines in the broader context of the United States healthcare 
system: 
…twenty-first century health care in the United States is becoming characterized by a 
single-minded quest for profitability that is threatening traditional notions of 
professionalism and community service (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2009, 200). 
This quote is interesting for several reasons. First of all, it shows that the care provided in a 
specialist-driven healthcare system does not line up with the image that most people have in 
mind when they think of doctors. Secondly, it shows that “traditional notions of professionalism 
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and community service” are (or were) actually holding back the development of the delivery of 
healthcare along the track of the capitalist mode of production. 
The theoretical development that Schneider et. al. lay out above repeatedly points to 
the maximization of profit in production as the single most distinctive aspect of specialty 
hospitals. Whether surgeon-owners have financial accountability to provide high-quality care, 
the single-minded mission of the specialty hospital gives them an administrative advantage, or 
the pursuit of higher patient volumes increases physicians’ medical abilities, the pursuit of profit 
absolutely shapes the way healthcare in specialty hospitals is provided, even from the 
neoclassical perspective. The most noticeable way in which this occurs is in the resource 
intensity of, or the application of capital to, treatment discussed above. This threatens to 
marginalize the role of the individual physician. Rather than allowing for this marginalization, 
physician ownership of hospitals allows them to maintain control over their working 
environment and the particular character of the treatments they provide. In short, ownership 
allows physicians to uphold the professional character of the delivery of healthcare. 
Physician-owners of specialty service lines own both the profit created by their venture 
as a whole and the value of their labor-power paid to them as a wage or salary. In this sense, 
they have the potential to actually live up to Marx’s strict conception of the capitalist: on the 
one hand, their labor-power is reproduced by the wage that they are paid; while on the other 
hand, they still have the ability to attend to the constant production of profit as the owners of 
the specialty service line. Physician ownership of specialty service lines allows physicians to 
simultaneously push away and embrace the trend of technologically-intensive specialty 
treatment. Where the applications of technology to medical treatment tends to minimize the 
69 
 
role of the physician’s personal style in performing surgery, physician ownership allows 
physicians to choose which technologies to apply and which to disregard. Limiting the 
application of technology allows physicians to maintain control of their role in production 
process. 
This immediately draws a comparison with the pre-capitalist craft producer; however, 
this comparison is not entirely appropriate. Where craft production is characterized by limited 
production in accordance with professional standards, specialty service line production of 
healthcare still fits the unlimited nature of capitalist production, and professional standards and 
community service are subordinated to the pursuit of profit. This is clearer nowhere than in the 
neoclassical theory of specialty service lines. The key advantages of specialized medical care are 
ever-higher volumes of patients and a laser-like focus on the highest-margin procedures and 
conditions. General hospitals are consistently characterized as institutions hampered by the 
mission of providing care to populations that are less able to pay or that need more routine, 
lower-profit treatments. While there are elements of craft production that are relevant to 
specialized healthcare, it is clear that specialized healthcare does not exist as a last holdout of an 
older mode of production, but is rather simply an anomaly within the capitalist mode of 
production. 
 Commodification and professionalization are clearly two trends that are opposed to 
each other. These two trends are not unique to specialty service lines; indeed, Starr (The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine 1984) provides an account of these trends in the larger 
healthcare system in a historical context. Specialty service lines are unique, however, in that 
they allow these two trends to coexist in one location—the specialty hospital—and in some 
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sense within one individual—the physician-owner. Specialty service lines are the dialectical 
synthesis of these two opposing trends. Commodification creates a narrow channel for 
consumer demand and requires that the production process be continually refined. These 
features serve to define the role of healthcare in society, but they also threaten to marginalize 
the role of the physician in healthcare. Professionalism, on the other hand, attempts to preserve 
the central position that the physician has in the provision of healthcare. The pressures of 
commodification cannot allow physicians to maintain a craft producer role, however, so the only 
recourse to preserve professionalism is for physicians to act as capitalists. Doing so allows them 
to take advantage of the beneficial aspects of commodification without losing their professional 
character. These two opposing trends clearly have important implications for the role of 
healthcare in society and the place of physicians in healthcare, although those implications are 
only explored in a very preliminary way here. Any further research in specialty service lines 
should account for these trends as well. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
 One thing should become clear through both the econometric and conceptual analyses 
above: specialty service lines exist within a wider context of the hospital market, the health 
insurance market, the specific characteristics of the surrounding population, and the capitalist 
mode of production as a whole. This being the case, any analysis that does not attempt to 
account for all of these features will be severely hampered in its attempts to explain why 
specialty service lines exist, how they provide care, and why they provide care in the specific 
way that they do. Specialty service lines hold important implications not only for clinical 
outcomes and cost reductions, but also for the role that healthcare plays in society as a whole, 
and for the position of individual healthcare providers in providing care. 
Previous studies have considered individual hospitals’ production characteristics as the 
key to understanding these questions, falling back on anecdotal explanations of market trends 
when the interviews and surveys fall short. One thing that all previous research seems to agree 
on is that specialty service lines offer higher-quality care and reduce costs. To attempt to 
examine and extend these claims, the present study employs various econometric techniques 
including hierarchical linear modeling—a relative newcomer to both economics and public 
health—using administrative data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, health 
insurance market data from the American Medical Association, and demographic data from the 
Health Resources and Services Administration in order to describe trends in terms of not only 
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individual hospital behavior, but in terms of the market factors that may affect this behavior. 
While specialty service lines do appear to provide higher quality care in the population 
examined in this study, it is not unambiguously clear that this quality difference is not also the 
result of complex interaction of market and regional characteristics. Certainly, the resource 
intensity of the care delivered in a hospital, which is generally identified as the cause of high-
quality care, does not play as significant a role as is typically theorized. Furthermore, there is 
little reason to believe that specialty service lines are lower-cost producers than their general 
hospital competitors. Where economies of scale exist, they are not unique to specialty hospitals. 
Market characteristics do have a significant impact on the cost structure of the hospital, and 
these market structures create constraints within which individual hospitals operate.  Although 
there is certainly a wide range of improvements that can be made to the econometric analysis, it 
is clear that the pursuit of profit in healthcare causes important changes to the way healthcare 
is provided. Certainly there are important insights to be gained in the analysis of specialty 
service lines from a neoclassical economics or public health perspective. However, doing so 
without accounting for larger trends is only doing part of the work. Thus, a greater perspective is 
able to yield more comprehensible and interesting results not only in econometric analysis, but 
also in allowing for a dialectical approach for understanding specialty service lines in the United 
States hospital system. 
 
 
73 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
American Medical Association. "Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study in U.S. 
Markets." Journal of the American Medical Association, 2007: 1-46. 
Anderson, Gerard F., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey, and Varduhi Petrosyan. "It's the Prices, 
Stupid: Why the United States is so Different from Other Countries." Health Affairs, 
2003: 89-105. 
Berenson, Robert A., Thomas Bodenheimer, and Hoangmai H. Pham. "Specialty Service Lines: 
Salvos in the New Medican Arms Race." Health Affairs, 2006: W337-W343. 
Bodenheimer, Thomas S, and Kevin Grumbach. Understanding Health Policy: a Clinical 
Approach. 5th Edition. New York: McGraw Hill Medical, 2009. 
Brookler, Katie, Jennifer Rothkopf, Sherri Ahmadi, and Michael Sajovetz. "Emergency Room and 
Hospital Use for Medicaid Clients Cared for by Federally-Qualified Health Centers vs. 
Private Provider Care." Health Affaris, June (Forthcoming) 2011. 
Cowing, Thomas G., and Alphonse G. Holtmann. "Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost 
Functions: Emperical Evidence and Policy Implications." Southern Economic Journal 
(Southern Economic Association) 49, no. 3 (January 1983): 637-653. 
Devers, Kelly, Linda Brewster, and Lawrence Casalino. "Changes in Hospital Competative 
Strategy: A New Medical Arms Race?" Health Services Research 38, no. 1p2 (February 
2003): 447-469. 
Diez-Roux, Ana V. "Multilevel Analysis in Public Health Research." Annual Review of Public 
Health, no. 21 (2000): 171-193. 
Dorfman, Robert, and Peter Steiner. "Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality." The American 
Economic Review (American Economic Association) 44, no. 5 (December 1954): 826-836. 
Dranove, David, Mark Shanley, and William White. "Price Competition in Hopital Markets: the 
Switch from Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven Competiton." Journal of Law and Economics 
(The University of Chicago Press) 36, no. 1 (April 1993): 179-204. 
74 
 
Ginsburg, Paul B., and Joy M. Grossman. "When the Price Isn't Right: How Inadvertant Payment 
Incentives Drive Medical Care." Health Affairs, 2005: 376-384. 
Government Accountability Office. Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location, Services Provided, 
and Financial Performance. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2003b. 
Government Accountability Office. Specialty Hospitals: Information on National Market Share, 
Physician Ownership, and Patients Served. Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2003a. 
Government Accountability Office. Specialty Hospitals: Information on Potential New Facilities. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 2005. 
Hox, J. J. Applied Multilevel Analysis. Amsterdam: TT-Publikaties, 1995. 
Lake, Timothy, Kelly Devers, Linda Brewster, and Lawrence Casalino. "Something Old, Something 
New: Recent Developments in Hospital-Physician Relationships." Health Services 
Research, 2003: 471-488. 
Light, Donald, and Sol Levine. "The Changing Character of the Medical Profession: A Theoretical 
Overview." The Milbank Quarterly (Blackwell Publishing) 66 (1988): 10-32. 
Marmot, Michael. "Social Determinants of Health Inequalities." The Lancet, 2005: 1099-1104. 
Marx, Karl. Capital: the Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Ben Fowkes. Vol. I. III vols. 
London: Penguin Books, 1990. 
—. Economic and Philosophic Mansucripts of 1844. Translated by Martin Milligan. Amherst, New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1988. 
—. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. 
London: Penguin Books, 1993. 
McGuire, Thomas G. "Physician Agency." In Handbook of Health Economics, edited by Anthony J. 
Culyer, & Joseph P. Newhouse, 461-536. Amsterdam: Elvesier, 2000. 
Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and 
Data Analysis Methods. 2nd. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 2006. 
Rice, Thomas. The Economics of Health Reconsidered. 2nd. Chicago: Heatlh Administration Press, 
2003. 
75 
 
Santerre, Rexford E., and Stephen P. Neun. Health Economics: Theory, Insights, and Industry 
Studies. 5th. Mason, Ohio: South-Western CENGAGE Learning, 2010. 
Schneider, John E., Thomas R. Miller, Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Michael A. Morrisey, Bennet A. Zelner, 
and Pengxiang Li. "The Economics of Sepcialty Hospitals." Medical Care Research and 
Review 65, no. 5 (June 2008): 531-553. 
Starr, Paul. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic Books, 1984. 
Twisk, Jos W. R. Applied Multilevel Analysis: A Practical Guide. New York: Cambrdige University 
Press, 2006. 
Varian, Hal. Microeconomic Analysis. 3rd. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992. 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Glossary of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Total Beds 
The number of beds that the hospital has available for short-
term acute care. Excludes skilled nursing facility (SNF) and swing 
beds 
Total Inpatients 
The number of patients admitted to the hospital for any 
inpatient treatment 
All Patient Market Share 
The number of patients treated at the individual hospital divided 
by the number of patients treated by all hospitals in the market. 
Although this variable has some market context, it is considered 
an individual level variable because it can be taken to represent 
total output 
Cardiac Inpatients 
The number of patients admitted to the hospital for treatment 
of a cardiac condition, as defined by the DRG into which their 
treatment falls 
Cardiac Patients Market 
Share 
The number of cardiac patients at the individual hospital divided 
by the total number of cardiac inpatients treated by all hospitals 
in the market. Although this variable has some market context, 
it is considered an individual level variable because it can be 
taken to represent cardiac care output 
Total Salary Cost 
The total amount spent on all salaries and wages in the hospital 
for all departments 
Total Non-Salary Cost 
The total amount spent on all inputs other than labor in the 
hospital for all departments 
Total Cost The sum of total salary and non-salary cost 
Total Nurses 
The total number of full-time equivalent (FTE) licensed practical 
nurses (LPNs) and registered nurses (RNs) on the hospital staff 
Nurse to Patient Ratio 
The number of total nurses on staff divided by the hospital’s 
average daily census; this measures the number of FTE nurses 
that could care for a patient on any given day 
Capital per Patient 
The total non-salary cost divided by the total number of 
inpatients served 
77 
 
Variable Definition 
 Cardiac Revenue 
The total amount of revenue the hospital received from 
Medicare (including Advantage plan reimbursement) for cardiac 
care 
Cardiac Cost 
The total cost the hospital reported for cardiac care provided to 
Medicare patients 
Cardiac Average Length of 
Stay 
The average number of days between admission and discharge 
for cardiac care 
ED Visits not Leading to an 
Inpatient Stay 
The total number of admissions to the hospital’s emergency 
room or trauma center that did not result in an inpatient stay 
Total ED visits 
The total number of admissions to the hospital’s emergency 
room or trauma center whether they led to an inpatient 
admission or not 
Inpatient Surgeries 
The total number of surgeries requiring hospitalization 
performed for all DRGs in the hospital 
Outpatient Surgeries 
The total number of surgeries not requiring hospitalization 
performed for all DRGs in the hospital 
All Surgeries The sum of inpatient surgeries and outpatient surgeries 
Services 
The number of distinct service lines the hospital is certified to 
provide to Medicare clients 
30-Day Coronary Mortality 
Rate* *** 
The total number of patients that are admitted to the hospital 
with either heart failure or acute myocardial infarction that die 
within thirty days 
30-Day Coronary 
Readmission Rate 
The total number of patients that are admitted to the hospital 
with either heart failure or acute myocardial infarction that are 
admitted to any hospital within thirty days 
Cardiac Average Cost The average cost per Medicare patient for a cardiac procedure 
Cardiac Average Charge 
The amount that the hospital billed Medicare for cardiac 
treatment 
Cardiac Inpatient HHI 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the hospital market for 
cardiac patients; the sum of the squares of individual hospitals’ 
cardiac market shares 
All Inpatient HHI 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the hospital market for total 
inpatient; the sum of the squares of individual hospitals’ total 
inpatient market shares 
MCO HHI 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the market for managed care 
products, including HMOs and PPOs; the sum of the squares of 
individual insurance companies’ market shares, where a market 
share is defined as the number of people enrolled in a plan 
divided by the total number of people not enrolled in Medicare 
or Medicaid 
Medicare Advantage Plan 
Penetration Rate 
The total number of people enrolled in a Medicare Advantage 
managed care organization divided by the total number of 
people enrolled in Medicare 
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Variable Definition 
Medicare Enrollees The total number of people enrolled in Medicare 
FQHCs The number of federally-qualified health centers in the market 
Coronary Death Rate 
The total number of people who died from reported causes of 
cerebrovascular disease, ischemic heart disease, or other 
cardiovascular diseases, per 100,000 people in the market 
Over 65 Poverty Rate 
The number of people in the market over the age of 65 with 
incomes below the federal poverty level per 100,000 people in 
the market 
Median Age The median age of individuals in the market 
CON Law Indicator 
A dummy variable to indicate whether the market has 
regulations that require hospitals to provide justification to for 
the construction of new facilities or expansion of services 
 
